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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS
by
Feifei Wang
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Kaz Miyagiwa, Major Professor
This dissertation investigates the factors that firms take into consideration when
they decide in which manner to expand internationally (i.e. foreign direct investment
and international trade). Another component of the investigation focuses on what
types of firms benefit the most and what are the associated benefits with expanding
internationally.
I investigate self-selection and learning-by-exporting hypothesis by applying matched
sampling techniques and non-structural econometric models. Using a Chinese firm-
level dataset, I find that firms that start exporting are more productive than non-
exporting ones. Additionally, in most industries exporters become more productive
in time.
I then investigate how income inequality leads firms to make different choices on
how they expand internationally. I develop a simple theoretical model by carefully
choosing a mean-preserving income distribution. I find that changing the mean-
preserving parameter of the income distribution affects market demand for firms’
products and firms’ choosing of strategies for international expansion. Some, but
not all firms gain market shares due to larger market size caused by the more
concentrated income distribution around the mean. Using Gini coefficient as the
proxy for income distribution, I demonstrate empirically that some firms gain market
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shares and benefit from more consumers becoming part of the middle class due to
the corresponding change in income distribution.
I also study the aggregate implication of opening the economy in a two-country
Dynamic Stochastic Equilibrium in which firms have heterogeneous productivity in
the spirit of Melitz (2003). I show that benefits incurred by international engage-
ment are not equally distributed among firms. I separate firms into four categories
based on their productivity levels. The highest productivity firms gain the most
by breaking into a new market as multinationals. The second highest productivity
firms become exporters and obtain the second largest market share. The third high-
est productivity firms only serve the domestic market, while the lowest productivity
firms exit the market.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
China has become the second largest economy in the world and is known as one
of the export-oriented countries thanks to its open-door policy that was enacted in
the late eighties of last century. Manufactures exports play a very important role in
the overall merchandise exports of China. On average China’s manufactures exports
accounts for 90% of China’s total merchandise exports.1 China’s unique role in the
world export market provides a rich background to analyze the relationship between
export behavior and firm performance. The supporting anecdotal evidence is abun-
dant and suggest large benefits gained by firms who engage in export activities.2
However, doubts about whether the export economy realizes higher productivity in
manufacturing sector still linger.
Bernard and Jensen (1999) propose two hypothese to explain the positive rela-
tionship between exporting activities and better performed firms. One hypothesis
is the self-selection hypothesis, which states that more productive firms self-select
themselves into the export market because they are usually larger and can overcome
the extra costs involved in exporting products. The premise for self-selection hy-
pothesis is that competition is tougher in the international market than the domestic
one because exporting firms are in a larger market and face more competitors. High
productivity is accrued prior to entering the exporting market.3 The other hypoth-
1The data source is acquired from the Worldbank database.
2Rhee, Pursell, and Ross-Larson (1984) documented the guiding role of foreign buyers
in the early development of Korean manufacturing. World Bank (1998) writes in a report
that ”... export is one of the most important ways for contunries to obtain knowledge from
abroad. ”, Blalock and Gertler (2004) interviewed several Indonesian exporting factory
managers and found similar evidence.
3Bernard and Wagner, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 1999 and 2004; Aw and Huang,
1995; Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Aw, Chung, and Roberts 2000; Delgado et al.,
1
esis is the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Firms participating in international
markets are exposed to more intense competition hence are more likely to grow
faster than their domestic counterparts through the knowledge transfer from foreign
buyers. Broadly speaking, learning-by-exporting includes knowledge, technology
transfer, and operational efficiencies that a firm may acquire through participating
in the international market by exporting.4 What is interesting is that empirical
evidence documenting technology acquisition through exporting is scarce. Many
research works seeking to investigate the causal relationship between exporting and
firm productivity reject the learning-by-exporting hypothesis.5 However, Van Biese-
brock (2005) and Blalock and Gertler (2004) find results that support the learning-
by-exporting hypothesis by examining cases of very poor countries: sub-Saharan
African countries and Indonesia, respectively. And Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000)
for Korea and Gimma et al. (2003) for UK both document significant productivity
increases after entering the export.
Moreover, Martins and Yang (2009) use a meta-analysis approach to examine 30
papers that study the causal relationship between exporting and firm productivity.6
They find that the impact of exporting on productivity is higher for developing coun-
tries than for developed countries and that such impact is higher in the first year
of exporting than at later years. Findings of learning-by-exporting in the less de-
veloped countries or developing countries may shed some light on a deduction that
2002; Castellani, 2002; Arnold and Hussinger, 20004; Alvarez and Lopez, 2004; and Lopez
2009.
4Blalock and Gertler, 2004.
5Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 1998, Bernard and Jensen 1999, Kraay 1999, Delgado,
Farinas, and Ruano 2002, Wagner 2004, De Loecker 2007; Aw, Roberts and Winston
2007; and Lileeva and Trefler 2010.
6Card and Krueger 1995; Ashenfelter et al. 1999; Pereira and Martins 2004.
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firms in poor countries have more to gain from exposure to international market
than firms in developed countries. Exporting firms may receive technical assistance
from international buyers and such knowledge eventually diffuses to other sellers.
Additionally, firms participating in international markets are exposed to more in-
tense competition hence may grow faster than their domestic counterparts through
the knowledge transfer from foreign buyers.
These aforementioned empirical results provide mixed evidences about the im-
pact of exporting on firms’ performance. Nevertheless, those findings underscore a
potential for economic development through international trade, and raise an im-
portant question about the causal relationship between exporting and productivity.7
This paper examines the self-selection hypothesis and investigates the possible
causal relationship between exporting and firm performance using a rich Chinese
firm-level dataset covering the entire manufacturing sector of China for the period
from 1998 to 2007.8 To my knowledge, this study is the first empirical attempt to
directly track the before-and-after exporting performance of Chinese manufacturing
firms.
Using the constructed Ollay-Pakes total factor productivity as the performance
measure, I deploy a linear probability model controlling for fixed effects to exam-
ine the self-selection hypothesis.9 I investigate the learning-by-exporting hypothesis
between exporting and productivity by applying the dynamic panel instrument ap-
proach from Kraay (1999) and matching technique developed by Becker and Ichino
7Firms’ total factor productivity is used as the sole measure of firms’ performance in
this study.
8I only use data of five consecutive years from 1998 to 2002 for self-selection hypothesis
investigation as data for this period contain the most continuously information on variables
of interest.
9I adopt the De Loecker (2007) version and allow for export into the estimation to
control for exporters specific unobserved productivity shocks and filter out common effects.
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(2002). The matching method allows me to use the propensity score matching tech-
nique to establish a control group to estimate the average treatment effects and
identify the productivity premium from entering export market more accurately. I
find that for five-year survivors the superior characteristics of Chinese exporters over
Chinese non-exporters are large. I show that there is strong evidence supporting the
self-selection hypothesis among Chinese exporters manufacturing firms. Comparing
with their predate total factor productivities, I also find in most manufacturing in-
dustries that Chinese exporting entrants become more productive participating in
the export market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 1.1, I provide
descriptive and preliminary analysis for Chinese manufacturing firms. In Section 1.2,
I briefly talk about the main choices for estimating firm productivity and conduct
the Ollay-Pakes productivity measure for Chinese manufacturing firms. In section
1.3, I test the self-selection hypothesis and learning-by-exporting hypothesis with
the dynamic panel instrument approach and applying propensity score matching
method.
1.1 Data and preliminary analysis
1.1.1 Data description
The Chinese firm-level survey is conducted by the Chinese Annual National Indus-
trial Organization. The annual survey is given to a manufacturing establishment
with yearly total sales of more than five hundred million yuan. Sales of the selected
firms in the study account for 95 % of total annual sales of all industrial firms in
China. The dataset contains both qualitative and quantitative information of each
4
firm for 29 industries for the 1998 - 2007 period.10 It is an unbalanced panel dataset
with information on topics such as firm basic information (firm addresses, contact
info, opening year, etc), ownership structure (private, state-owned, foreign), output
value, sales, value added, expenses, assets, labor (head count and wages), market
entry and exit, exports with entry and exit information, intermediate inputs, and fi-
nancial accounting information.11 The key variable under investigation is the export
status: at any point in time whether a firm is an exporter, a continuing exporter, a
quitter or a domestic producer only. One must keep in mind that some firms may
intentionally misreport manufacturing and financial information out of concern that
government and tax authorities may gain access to the data and introduce troubles
to the firm. However, since I assume such misreporting behavior is presented consis-
tently overtime, the fixed-effect method in the analysis reduces such biased impact
of over-reporting or under-reporting on my estimates.
I deflate data using the corresponding most disaggregated Producer Price Index
(PPI) for constant prices. However, this method is not enough to control for the sit-
uation in which factor prices and output might be different and/or evolve differently
over time for exporters.
Some key firm characteristics such as value added, R&D, investment and de-
tailed employment are either listed discontinued or are left blank for some years.
Constructing propensity scores to match requires data with no missing values, for
this reason I am forced to reduce the sample data from the original size to a sam-
pled dataset which contains full information on 16,808 firms that operate nonstop
10The unit of observation is a single firm of a particular year. Each firm is assigned a
unique identification code.
11Only firms that remain active in each of the consecutive years are taken into account.
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Figure 1.1: Average cost ratio between exporters and non-exporters
in years between 2001 and 2006.12 I divide the sample data into two groups based
on export status of these firms. And I make sure all sample firms survive the entire
sample period.
I define never-exporters as firms that never export during the sample period
time. I choose exporters that begin exporting in year 2003 and onward. In addition,
I make sure that all the selected firms do not export in first two sampled years.
Furthermore, for the purpose of constructing a control group with significantly less
noises I restrict exporters to continuous exporters only. As a result, the number of
observations are reduced to 6,065 firms per sample year. Therefore, I am able to
include sample firms of both types that operate in the entire sample period. Having
two groups of these selected firms allows me to track firm productivity projectile
throughout the sample period of time. I have no way of knowing whether firms
128,927 when I restrict exporting firms that export no earlier than year 2003 firms.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics for exporters and non-exporters
that never exported in year 2001 and 2002 had any previous exporting experience.
However, I assume they did not export in 2001 and 2002.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the average costs ratio of exports relative to those of non-
exporters and their corresponding export shares. We can see that overall, Chinese
exporters exhibit advantage in their average costs comparing with Chinese non-
exporters. Such advantage becomes more prominent as the export share increases
within the same industry. For example, Chinese manufacturing firms with 50%
export share are more than one third more efficient than the Chinese non-exporters
operating within the same industry.
Table 1.1 presents the differences between exporters and non-exporters in the
selected sample. It shows that potential exporters invest heavily prior to the entry
into the export market, which seems to be in accordance with the aforementioned
self-selection hypothesis. Table 1.1 also shows that three years after entering an
international market, exporters expand production frontiers a lot faster than non-
exporters to meet international demands. This can be seen from the fact that
exporters increase investment by 40% relative to only 6% by non-exporters from
year 2005 to year 2006. Table 1.1 indicates a similar level of the capital-labor ratio
between exporters and non-exporters. The reason that capital-labor ratio does not
differ that much in between exporters and non-exporters mainly comes from the fact
7
that non-exporters are losing workers and that some capitals are left idled, indicating
higher turnover rates for them and the possibility of switching to other industries
due to tougher competition. On the contrary, exporters experience expansion in
size and hire more workers. The increase in the wage for exporters is almost twice
higher than that for non-exporters. One possible reason is the necessity to employ
more high skilled workers relative to non-exporters, which in turn may result in
technology transfers. Another possible explanation is that workers in exporting
firms ask for higher wages. Expecting to enter an export market, exporters increase
more in holding inventories relative to non-exporters in the case of bigger demand
in the international market, notably in year 2002 and 2003.
1.1.2 Preliminary analysis
In this subsection, I show statistically that exporters are different than non-exporters
as shown in the relevant trade literature. Exporters are in general larger in size, pay
higher wages, more capital-intensive and more productive than non-exporters. Ex-
amples include Aw and Hwang (1995), Bernard and Jensen (1995), (1997a), (1997b),
(1997c), (1999), Roberts and Tybout (1996), Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998),
Castellani (2002), Wagner (2002), Greenaway and Kneller (2003), Alvarez and Lopez
(2004), Van Biesebroeck (2006) and De Loecker (2007).
I run the following OLS regressions as shown in equation (1.1) to test for the
exporter premia.
lnZitj = α + βEXPitj + γControlitj + µitj (1.1)
where Zit refers to the characteristics of firm i at time t active in industry j, EXPitj
is an export dummy variable equal to one when the firm i is an exporter at time t
in industry j and zero otherwise, and Controlitj is a vector of control variables con-
8
Figure 1.2: Productivity trajectories of grouped exporters and non-exporters
taining size effect (log of employment is used as a proxy for the size effect), industry
effects (4-digit industry dummies), ownership effects (ownership dummies) and year
effects (year dummies). Although my analysis focuses on individual industry, I also
run equation (1.1) for the entire manufacturing sector to get a more comprehensive
picture.
Table 1.2 shows the results of equation (1.1). According to the estimates, Chinese
exporters are on average 30.43% more productive in terms of output per worker than
Chinese non-exporters.13 Chinese exporters are also 9.23% more capital intensive
relative to their domestic counterparts. In addition, Chinese exporters pay higher
wages (10.25%) and hire more (32.55%) workers than non-exporting firms.
In Figure 1.2 I plot the total factor productivity trajectories of grouped exporters
and non-exporters from 1998 to 2001.14 Figure 1.2 confirms my finding that Chinese
exporters in general have better performance in their average total factor productiv-
13Output per worker is calculated as a ratio of real output relative to numbers of em-
ployees. And it is also used as a proxy to labor productivity.
14I use year 2002 as the bench year. New entrants are firms that did not export in the
first four years until year 2002; non-exporters are firms that did not export through out
the five years; quitters are firms that exported in the first four years but quitted in the
final year; and exporters are firms that exported for five years.
9
Table 1.2: Firm characteristics differences between non-exporters and exporters
ities than Chinese non-exporters have. The continuous exporters have the highest
average productivity from the beginning to the end and their productivity presents
an upward trend. The non-exporters exhibit the lowest average productivity com-
pared to the other three groups. New entrants and quitters appear to share similar
levels of average productivity. This might indicate that new entrants managed to
improve their performance prior to entering the export market and begin their first
foreign sales. The average productivity of quitters starts to decline two years before
officially quitting the export market. Although these results do not determine the
causal relationship from performing good to exporting, Figure 1.2 provides further
evidence for self-selection hypothesis and suggests that good Chinese firms become
exporters.
Tybout (2003) and De Locker (2007) suggest that the decision to export could
well have happened before the export sales records entering the database. This also
seems to be the case for Chinese exporters. In Figure 1.3 I present a graphical
framework to illustrate the overall total factor productivity trajectories of Chinese
exporters and non-exporters.
In Figure 1.3 on the vertical axis I plot the average total factor productivity for
two groups of firms under investigation: Chinese exporters and non-exporters. The
10
Figure 1.3: Overall Productivity Trajectory for non-exporters and exporters
selected starting year is 2001. For the first two years all firms are non-exporters and
only sell in the domestic market until year 2003. In year 2003 exporting firms start
to enter the export market. Figure 1.3 shows that Chinese exporters are already
more productive than their domestic counterparts before entering the export market.
Moreover, the productivity gap between exporters and non-exporters widens after
the engagement in international market, suggesting a trace of evidence of learning-
by-exporting hypothesis of Chinese exporters.
1.2 Productivity estimation
Since the analysis is centered on firm productivity before-and-after exporting, re-
liable estimates of firm total factor productivity are required to obtain consistent
results. There are various empirical methodologies presented in the trade literature
as for how to estimate firm total factor productivity properly. Van Bieseberoeck
11
(2007) summarizes and compares the robustness of five most frequently used es-
timating techniques: a) index numbers, b) eta development analysis (DEA), c)
stochastic frontiers (SF), d) instrumental variables (GMM) and e) semi paramet-
ric estimation (Olley and Pakes, 1996). Each method has its unique strengths and
weakness.15 Due to certain restrictions in the data, my choice of the total factor
productivity estimation is based on Olley and Pakes (1996).
To estimate the total factor productivity for Chinese manufacturing firms using
Ollay-Pakes methodology, I assume a production function for each Chinese manu-
facturing firm as follows:16
Yijt = D(Kijt, Lijt,Mijt, aijt, fij)e
ωijt+ijt (1.2)
where Yijt is the real gross output of the ith firm in industry j in year t, and Kijt,
Lijt, Mijt, aijt and fij are real capital, labor, firm age, intermediate inputs and firm
specific fixed effects, respectively.17 Intermediate inputs include energy, materials
and an estimate of purchased services. The term eωij+ijt is added to the production
function to represent a productivity level that is unobservable to econometricians
and a disturbance term that is assumed to be Independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d). in each time period. The productivity shock is assumed as a state
variable seen by the firm only and follows a Markov process unaffected by the firm’s
control variables.
15For further information about each method, please refer to Van Bieseberoeck (2007)
for more technical details.
16I assume the same production function for each firm in every industry. I try to
avoid biasing the results by pooling across industries with widely varying technologies so I
assume the same technology within the same industry but allow technology to vary across
different industries. By estimating coefficients for each firm in each industry, coefficients
are allowed to vary.
17Allowing for firm fixed effects in time-series cross-sectional production will provide
more explanation of the productivity distribution. (Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992.)
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For the purpose of estimating, I apply a log transformation to equation (1.2) to
form the following translog production function:
lnYijt = β0 + β1lnKijt + β2lnLijt + β3lnMijt + β4aijt + β5ln
2Kijt+
+ β5ln
2Lijt + β6ln
2Mijt + β7a
2
ijt + β8lnKijtlnLijt+
+ β9lnKijtlnMijt + β10lnKijtaijt + β11lnLijtlnMijt+
+ β12lnLijtaijt + fij + T + ωijt + ijt
(1.3)
where T is a dummy variable for year t. The second-order logarithmic approximation
of the production function places no functional form restrictions on the nature of
return to scale. The total factor productivity is assumed as an unobserved plant-
specific effect that can be estimated from a production function as the difference
between real and predict values of firms’ output. However, equation (1.3) cannot
be consistently estimated by the OLS method as in reality more productive firms
are more likely to export. In addition, firms can observe the productivity shocks
(better managerial ability for example) that econometricians can not observe. These
unobserved productivity shocks are included in the error terms hence tend to bias
the estimates upwards. Moreover, firms with large capital stocks are more likely to
survive the negative productivity shocks than firms with small size capital stocks.
These small capital firms tend to self-select out of the market, therefore bias the
estimates downwards. In order to get more consistent estimation results, both the
simultaneity and the self-selection issue are needed to be controlled for.
I apply the Olley and Pakes (1996) three-stage estimation algorithm to control for
aforementioned simultaneity bias and the selection bias in the estimation production
functions. The residual of each estimation is used as the measure of the total factor
productivity for each firm.
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The first stage regression equation is established as follows:
yijt = β0 + βllijt + βkkijt + βmmijt + βaaijt + fij + ωijt + ijt (1.4)
where yijt, lijt, kijt, and mijt are log values of the real output, real labor, real
capital stock, and intermediate inputs; aijt is the age of the firm; fij is a firm
specific fixed effect; ωijt is the productivity shock observed by the decision-maker
but not by the econometrician; And ijt is an i.i.d error term. Let φ˜t(iijt, kijt) =
β0 + βkkijt + βaaijt + ht(iijt, kijt). ht(iijt, kijt) is used to control for simultaneity
problem.18 Since the functional form of φ˜t(iijt, kijt) is not known the coefficients βl
and βk are estimated by proxying a functional form for φ˜t(iijt, kijt) using a second-
order polynomial expansion in variables of choice as well as instrumental variables.19
The first stage provides unbiased estimates for labor.
The second stage is used to control for the self-selection problem and achieved
so by regressing lagged variables of choices on the binary exit variable exitijt. The
second stage estimating function is defined as follows:
P (exitijt = 1|It) = P [exitijt = 1|ωijt−1(Iijt−1, kijt−1, aijt−1)] (1.5)
where exitijt is the dummy variable for the an exit firm; and ωijt−1 is a specific state
variable. Whether a firm chooses to stay in the market depends on its total factor
productivity ωijt−1, and in turn on the firm’s age, capital stock, and investment level
at time t− 1. The probability of survival is examined by fitting a probit model on
investment level at time t − 1 Iijt−1, capital stock at time t − 1 kijt−1, firm age at
time t− 1 aijt−1 and on instrument variables.
18ht(iijt, kijt) is the inverse function of the investment function, assuming a strictly
increase relationship between productivity shock ωijt and the investment i.
19Interaction terms between labor and capital, intermediate inputs and capital stocks,
capital stocks and firm age, firm age and intermediate inputs, and squared individual
terms.
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The third stage is an additional step used to control for the self-selection problem
and to acquire consistent estimates for capital stock and firm age. In the third step,
I fit the following equation by a nonlinear least square function:
yijt − βllijt − βmmijt = βkkijt + βaaijt+
+ g(φˆt−1 − βkkijt−1 − βaaijt−1, Pˆijt)+
+ fij + ωijt + ijt
(1.6)
With consistent labor and capital estimates obtained using these three steps, I estab-
lish the total factor productivity proxy or the residual by calculating the following
equation:
Ωijt = e
(yijt−blij lijt−bkijkijt−baijaijt−bmijmmij) (1.7)
Please note that these estimated total factor productivities are firm-specific and
time-varying since I do not assume the same technology across industries for each
individual firm.
1.3 Econometric models
1.3.1 Test the self-selection hypothesis
In this subsection, I further investigate the self-selection hypothesis using an econo-
metric model developed by Bernard and Jensen (1999). According to Bernard and
Jensen (1999), a firm exports only when current and future expected revenues exceed
costs.20 I use the proposed binary choice non-structural econometric model to esti-
mate for self-selection hypothesis. And the suggested binary equation is established
as follows:
Exportit = αi + βXit−1 + γExportit−1 + ψi + µit (1.8)
20Entry costs are sunk and included.
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Table 1.3: Firms’ decision to export
where Exportit is an export dummy variable for firm i in year t. Xit−1 is firm
characteristics such as total factor productivity, size (log of employment) and hu-
man capital (log of wage). One period lagged variables are used to reduce possible
simultaneity issues. And Xit−2, Xit−3, Exportit−2 and Exportit−3 are used as in-
struments. The variable ψi is included to reflect the unobserved firm heterogeneity
such as proprietary technology. Control variables are included in the regression to
control for fix effects.21 The actual estimation is done by using the first-difference
form of equation (1.9) to get more consistent estimators. The first-difference form
of equation (1.9) is presented as follows:
∆Exportit = β∆Xit−1 + γ∆Exportit−1 + ∆µit (1.9)
Table 1.3 reports the coefficients of firm characteristics results from equation
(1.9), which is the first-difference linear probability model.
All results are significant at 1% level. I find that total factor productivity, wage
and employment are positively related to the probability of exporting. A 10% in-
21Full sets of year dummies, 4-digit industry dummies and ownership dummies are
included in the model.
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crease in productivity results in a 0.006% increase in the probability of exporting.
This suggests that a higher productivity does tend to lead to higher exporting prob-
ability. For a 10% increase in wage, the probability of exporting goes up by 0.198%,
whereas a 10% increase in employment results in a 0.154% increase in the probability
of exporting. Therefore, the pattern revealed in this regression is that all produc-
tivity, wage and employment play important and positive roles in the determination
of entering into the export market.
Another interesting result lies in the estimate for previous exporting status. The
negative relationship between the first difference and the exporting status means
that once the firm enters or exits the export market, it is less likely that the situation
will be reversed. In other words, the chance for the firm to re-enter the export market
is decreased once the firm is driven out of the export market. Table 1.3 shows
quantitatively that if a firm leaves the export market last year, the probability to
come back to export market in next year decreases by 4.98%. Likewise, if a firm
exported last year, the probability of the firm to exit the export market during
the next year falls by 4.98%. And this result is generally taken as evidence of the
presence of sunk entry costs to the export market.
1.3.2 Propensity score and matching
I show in the last subsection that the average performance of Chinese exporters is
better than Chinese non-exporters. However, the comparison of average performance
between exporters and non-exporters does not reveal any causal effects of exporting
activities on the the performance of Chinese exporting firms.
Having biased estimates using a firm-level dataset is unavoidable since it is ob-
served data entry and does not come from randomized lab trials. Therefore, I use
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the propensity score matching method proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to
reduce the bias in the estimation of treatment effects with the observational Chinese
firm-level dataset. To do so, I construct a control group for the designed treatment
group as a quality control group is crucial for the propensity score matching method
to take effect sufficiently good.22
I define the propensity score as the conditional probability of exposure to a
treatment (exporting, denoted as EXP = 1) given pretreatment firm characteristics:
p(X) ≡ Prob(EXP = 1|X) = E(EXP |X) (1.10)
where X is the multidimensional vector of pretreatment firm characteristics and
EXP is the treatment (exporting). After acquiring the propensity score (p(X)),
the causal effect of exporting on the total factor productivity can be estimated as
follows:23
E{y1it − y0it|EXPit = 1} = E[E{y1it|EXPit = 1, p(Xi)}−
− E{y0it|EXPi = 0, p(Xit)}|EXPit = 1}]
(1.11)
where y1it denotes the outcome (the total factor productivity) of firm i in period t,
and y0it is the outcome of firm i had it not exported. The binary variable EXPit
takes on the value 1 if firm i exports at period t and zero otherwise.
Given the assumption that firms of the same cell exposed to exporting activity
is random, the treatment of exporting acts as an exogenous shock from outside. As
the treatment happens, treated firms ’automatically’ export by design. As opposed
to self-select themselves into export market, exporting firms of all firms in the same
22As Becker and Ichino (2003) stress, the propensity score matching program is to reduce
instead of eliminate the bias generated by unobservable confounding factors.
23As Becker and Ichino (2003) states, treatment units and control units should be on
average observationally identical given the assumption that exposure to treatment (ex-
porting) is random.
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cell are randomly selected to export, and the rest (the control firms) have the equal
probability of being chosen but for some reasons are not selected. This mechanism
has little if nothing to do with the proposed self-selection hypothesis that suggests
more productive firms’ self-selection into the export market. I adopt the proposi-
tion by Hallward-Driemeier, Iarossi and Sokoloff (2002), which states that it is in
aiming for the export market for higher profit opportunities that firms increase their
total factor productivities. I treat firms in each cell as exporting ready since they
are assumed done with the improvements in various core firm characteristics. The
treatment now can be treated as the export quota. Firms in the same cell have
equal probabilities of given a permission to export.
However, there is a key problem in equation (1.11), which is that y0it is not
observable in the data. I construct a counterfactual for the term y0it that represents
outcomes (total factor productivities) that firms would have experienced in the
export market had they not engaged in the export market. A valid control group
among non-exporters is needed as the goal is to find a group in which the distribution
of the variables affecting the outcome variables is as close as possible to the exporting
firm in terms of its predicted probability to exporting. I assume that all differences
between exporters and the appropriately selected control group are acquired by a
vector of observables representing characteristics of firm i including the pre-export
total factor productivity. The difference excludes the impact caused by export
activities. I use a probit model with a dependent variable equal to 1 if a firm
starts exporting and 0 elsewhere on lagged observables and higher order polynomial
terms. And the proposed probit model is established as follows:
p(EXPit = 1) = F{h(TFPi−1, capitalit−1, humancapitalit−1, sizeit−1, age)} (1.12)
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where F function in equation (1.12) is the normal cumulative distribution function.
I include a full set of year dummies to control for common aggregate shocks. I take a
full polynomial in the elements of h(.) to improve the matching, thus freeing up the
functional form as shown in Woolbridge (2002) and De Locker (2007). The difference
in productivity is thus conditioned on pre-export levels of productivity, capital,
human capital (proxied by wages), firm size (proxied by number of employees), firm
age, and other relevant firm-level covariates.
Before estimating the propensity score, I test the Balancing Hypothesis for equa-
tion (1.12). I run the following algorithm: (i) split the sample into k equally spaced
intervals intervals of the propensity score pit and test within each interval that the
average pit of treated and control units do not differ, (ii) within each interval test
that the means of each characteristic do not differ between treated and control units.
If the balancing property is not satisfied a less parsimonious specification of h(.) is
needed.24 For different industries, the effects of covariates on the probability to
export may differ across different sectors due to different technology and market
shocks. I run estimates for each industry separately to obtain the probability to
export of each firm. This method is less restrictive as opposed to estimation for the
entire manufacturing sector.
In principle, the probability of observing two firms with exactly the same value
of a propensity score is impossible since p(X) is a continuous variable. To overcome
this problem, I choose the Nearest-Neighbor Matching method.25 Let pit denote
24For technical details please refer to Becker and Ichino (2002).
25It should be noted that the nearest neighbor may have a very distinctive p(X) so the
match can be very poor. Nevertheless, such matching would contribute to the estimation
of the treatment effect regardless of the difference. (Becker and Ichino, 2003).
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the the predicted export probability for firm i at time t.26 A non-exporting firm j
is selected in terms of its propensity score closest to that of a exporting firm as a
match for the exporting firm. The set of control units matched to the treated unit
i with an estimated p(X) is stated as follows:
Control(it) = |pit − pjt| = min
j
||pit − pjt|| (1.13)
I conduct the matching process for each 3-digit SIC manufacturing sector. The
control groups are therefore constructed within narrowly defined sectors. Nearest-
neighbor matching indicates that only a subset of the sample of each industry is
used to estimate.27
1.3.3 The average effect of treatment on the treated
I rewrite Control(it) as C(it). Variables Y t and Y c are the estimated total factor
productivities of the treated sample and the controls, respectively. Assuming NEt
firms exporting at time t and the number of control units as N ci , then the weight
is defined as wij =
1
Nci
. I then estimate the productivity difference of treated firms
that export at each period t compared with a weighted average of productivity of a
control unit at each period t based on nearest-neighbor method. The average effect
of treatment on the treated or the learning-by-exporting effect denoted as βLBE can
be estimated as follows:
βLBE =
1
NEt
∑
i∈T
(
Y 1it −
∑
j∈C(i)
wijY
c
jt
)
(1.14)
26For convenience I rewrite p(EXPit) as pit.
27The sample is reduced drastically due to the imposing of the common support restric-
tion.
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And the corresponding variance is calculated using the following equation:
V ar(βLBE) =
(
1
NEt
)2{∑
i∈T
V ar(Y 1it )−
∑
j∈C(i)
(wij)
2V ar(Y cjt)
)
(1.15)
1.3.4 Estimated results
In the last subsection I use a logit model based on equation (1.12) to estimate
propensity scores for firms in the same industry; I test for theBalancing Hypothesis
for each propensity score estimated; and I construct control units for each individual
industry and account for all fixed effects. Table 1.4 summarizes my findings for the
manufacturing sectors that satisfy the Balancing Hypothesis. Column (ii) shows the
average impact of exporting on the level of total factor productivity at every period
of time t. Column (ii) presents a average change in productivity growth rate in each
period t as a result of exporting. I also list the number of treated and control units
that are being matched together based on the estimated propensity scores.28
I find some evidence in various Chinese manufacturing industries that support
the learning-by-exporting hypothesis according to Table 1.4. Over the selected years
of exporting, Chinese exporters grow faster and perform better than in pre-export
era in terms of their total factor productivity. Chinese exporters also perform better
in terms of total factor productivity than their domestic counterparts.
The positive treatment effects on the level of total factor productivities are sta-
tistically significant on the total factor productivity outcome for the following in-
dustries: the non-metal industry with 8.1 percentage points increase, the textile
industry with 9.3 percentage points increase, the pharmaceutical industry with 14.5
percentage points increase, and the plastics manufacturing industry with 10.4 per-
28Notice that the number of treated and controls has decreased dramatically for both
treated units and control units due to the implementation of Nearest Neighbor matching.
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centage points jump.The textile industry is the only industry that is statistically
significant at a 5% level, the rest of the three industries are significant at 10% lev-
els. The positive treatment effects are statistically significant on the growth rate of
total factor productivity outcome for the following industries: the paper industry
with 3.8 percentage points increase, the non-metal industry with 4 percentage points
increase, the primary metal industry with 14.5 percentage points increase, the fab-
ricated metal industry with 5.1 percentage points increase, the general equipment
industry with 3.5 percentage points increase, and the office supplies industry with
5.3 percentage points increase. Only the general equipment industry is statistically
significant at the 5% level and the rest of the listed industries are significant at
the 10% level. Although the results are not statistically significant, negative treat-
ment effects present in a few industries on both the productivity and growth rate of
the productivity outcomes. Examples are both outcomes for the apparel industry,
the productivity outcome for the paper industry and the productivity outcome for
general equipment industry. In addition, industries like food processing, apparel,
chemicals, transportation equipment and electrical equipment do not exhibit statis-
tically significant results. In fact, the apparel industry shows negative impacts of
exporting activity on both outcome variables.
Overall, these growth rates of total factor productivity are found to be positively
associated with gains in corresponding levels of total factor productivities. Meaning
the two outcome variables under study move in the same direction giving treatments.
However, these estimated results show that Chinese exporters of the manufacturing
sector do not across the board significantly improve in terms of their performance
or total factor productivity faster than Chinese non-exporters of the same sector
by participating in the export market; The food processing industry, apparel and
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Table 1.4: Estimated learning-by-exporting effects for selected industries
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nonferrous metal industry and electrical equipment, for example, all show negative
treatment effects on their outcomes.
1.4 Conclusion
Using the Chinese manufacturing firm-level dataset, I construct the total factor
productivity as the performance measure of a firm by applying the Ollay-Pakes
productivity methodology for Chinese manufacturing firms. The first difference
estimation results provide evidence for the self-selection hypothesis and suggest that
better Chinese firms enter the export market. I then test the learning-by-exporting
hypothesis with dynamic panel instrument approach and applying propensity score
matching. I also find in various manufacturing industries that Chinese exporting
entrants become more productive by participating in the export market .
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CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION
Firms that aim to expand their businesses internationally often face the same
question: should they invest in plants that can manufacture and sell goods locally
in selected host countries or should they sell their products to overseas consumers
while manufacturing in their domestic factories? This paper tackles the aforemen-
tioned fundamental dilemma facing these firms by asking the following question:
how should domestic firms choose their international expansion strategies given two
strategic options which are the horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) and ex-
port, respectively? I try to establish relationships between export and foreign direct
investment as alternative modes of international expansions by building a theoretical
model first and testing it with a carefully crafted econometric model.
I restrict foreign direct investment strategy to the local market oriented horizon-
tal FDI and comply with the established FDI definition presented in the relevant
trade literature. According to the definition, horizontal FDI refers to investments in
overseas production facilities that are built to serve only local consumers in the host
country. Investing abroad requires mandatory sunk costs to build foreign plants,
whereas the export strategy involves in unavoidable trade costs such as transport
costs and tariffs. I assume the iceberg type per unit trade cost as the sole form of the
trade cost. A firm chooses to invest in a foreign country when gains from avoiding
trade costs surpass costs required to maintain the capacity in the same host market
(Helpman, 2003). For this reason, the firm has an incentive to engage in the FDI
strategy instead of exporting.
In this study, I develop a simple theoretical model to explore: 1) how firms
make investment decisions on expansionary strategies into international market by
choosing between horizontal FDI and export; and 2) the effect of the change in
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consumers’ income distribution of the foreign country on these firms’ international
expansion decisions. I utilize a specially designed mean-preserving income distribu-
tion and investigate the strategy of producing abroad versus the alternative strategy
of exporting by comparing market demand before and after the change in income dis-
persion or concentration determined by a spreading parameter of the chosen income
distribution function.1 I assume a fixed foreign market size. The change in mar-
ket demand comes from the change in consumers’ personal income levels hence the
income distribution. The change in market demand affects aggregate revenues and
aggregate profits earned by entered firms. This effect in turn allows me to establish
a connection between the change in income distribution and firms’ profitability.
One of the underlying assumptions in my investigation is that each consumer
has demand for one and only one unit for a reservation price less than or equal to
his or her valuation of a consumption good and zero units for any prices above such
reservation price. I assume that each consumer’s valuation of a product is directly
related to his or her income level, therefore a consumer’s reservation price is proxied
by his or her income.
As the trade and FDI literature suggests, many factors affect firms’ production-
location decisions. My study does not consider such case in which factor supplies af-
fect production-location decisions as they do in vertical integration models motivated
by differentials in factor costs and intensities. Instead, I address the relationship
between exporting and producing overseas as alternative modes of foreign-market
penetration by domestic or multinational firms taking into account the income dis-
tribution of the foreign market. This means that I explore the extent to which a
trade-off between multinational production-location decisions, namely maximizing
1I assume a mean-preserving income distribution in a sense of the second order stochas-
tic dominance. When the distribution changes its mean value remains the same.
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proximity to customers by manufacturing abroad through horizontal FDI and/or
achieving scale economies by producing at home, can be explained by the distribu-
tional change in consumers’ income.
Lambert and Pfahler (1997) study the effect of distributional changes on the
size of the market for a certain price level via the shape of the consumers’ Engel
curves. Benassi, et al (2002) demonstrate that the concentration in the middle class
leads to a more elastic market and a relevant segment of demand expanding, which
explains the phenomenon that markets patronized by richer consumers benefit from
the middle class entering because of the corresponding bigger market size and lower
prices.
Whether export and FDI are substitutes or complements is a heated debate
in the rich and ongoing trade and FDI literature and often leads to conflicting
findings in relevant research. Many empirical works attempting to tackle this issue
struggle to find solid evidences that support the proposition of FDI and exporting
as alternative strategies. However, some empirical research such as Swedenborg
(1979) and Blomstrom et al.(1988) regarding multinationals find that exports and
multinational sales in foreign markets complement one another.
Using gini coefficient as a proxy for the income distribution dispersion, I am able
to partially test the theoretical model by developing an econometric model with
fixed effects. I assume that well established factors such as internal aspects and
external components as potential determinants of FDI and/or export besides profits
after sales are given. I also omit the other factors such as exogenous and policy
factors that might affect the magnitude of FDI. These factors are controlled for
by country-level and industry-level fixed effects. In addition, I distinguish trade be-
tween intra-industry trade and non-intra-industry trade hoping to eliminate the con-
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cern that affiliate sales and exports are complements.2 Furthermore, I address the
possible simultaneity problems between affiliate productions and exports through
taking into account the following factors: exchange rates, internalization, corporate
taxes, tariffs, transport costs and institution quality. The trade and FDI literature
shows that these factors may also affect multinationals’ decision making on interna-
tional expansion. Brainard (1997) finds support for the internalization hypothesis.
Horst (1972) finds that both affiliate production and exports are increasing in R&D
intensity. Harrigan (1993) finds that trade flows are decreasing in tariff levels. An-
derson (1979) and Bergstarad (1985) show that transport costs raise the delivered
price of imports to consumers. Brainard (1997) finds that affiliate production rises
as a share of total foreign sales the greater are transport costs and foreign trade
barriers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2.1, I discuss
the choice of and model the income distribution, and establish the relationship
between the income distribution, market demand and price. In Section 2.2 and the
subsequent subsections, I introduce horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) and
export as alternative strategies for expanding internationally and discuss different
case scenarios in which firms make decisions on international investments based on
profitability. In section 2.3 and its subsections, I develop an empirical model with
fixed effects and use the chosen FDI and trade data to test the theoretical model.
2Intra-industry trade is trade between multinational firms headquarters and their for-
eign affiliates.
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2.1 Model
2.1.1 Modeling the income distribution
Consumers’ heterogeneity is an important element in explaining market behaviors.
In this investigation I study consumers’ income heterogeneity and model this het-
erogeneity by choosing a mean preserving income distribution in a sense that an
increase in the mean preserving parameter can be viewed as an increase in income
dispersion that leaves the average income unchanged. I assume that consumers have
the same preferences but differ only in their incomes.
The reason that I model the distributive shifts in consumers’ income levels in the
form of mean preserving changes is that these changes in the income distribution can
be thought of as the widely known phenomena of income polarization and shrinking
of rising middle class, which have characterized many countries in both the developed
and developing world over the last two decades.
I model the mean preserving income distribution with a continuous differentiable
unimodal density function denoted as f(I, α), defined over some positive interval
Imin < I < Imax. Variable I represents consumers’ income levels with Imin and Imax
being the corresponding minimum value and the maximum value in the interval,
respectively. The parameter (α) serves as the desired mean preserving spread that
drives my analysis. I define the following rule for the mean preserving parameter
(α): a change in the mean preserving parameter α results in the change in the spread
of the income distribution while leaving the mean income intact.
I denote I as the modal income of the mean preserving income distribution.
The cumulative density function of the income distribution can be established as
F (I, α) =
∫ Imax
Imin
f(x, α) dx. And the corresponding density function f(x, α) of the
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income distribution has the following properties:
∂f(I,α)
∂I
= 0, if I = I
∂f(I,α)
∂I
> 0, if I < I
∂f(I,α)
∂I
< 0, if I > I
(2.1)
The corresponding cumulative density function (CDF) and probability density
function graphs of the income distribution can have complicated shapes. The CDFs
can intersect multiple times as long as ∂F
1(I,α)
∂α
starts out flatter than ∂F
2(I,α)
∂α
and the
gap between areas under the two CDFs does not close entirely until the end-point
Imax.
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To ease computation of my theoretical model without great loss of generality, I
impose some necessary conditions on the CDF of the income distribution F (I, α).
First, an increase in the mean preserving spread parameter (α) is defined as shifting
pairs of probability weights on either side of the mean farther away, while leaving the
mean value unchanged. Second, CDFs of income distributions only intersect once
in between the starting point (Imin) and the end-point (Imax) so it is of a simple
type by Rothschild and Stigliz (1971).
To get a better idea about these assumptions, I show a concrete example for
each CDF, density function and Fα(p, α) function of such mean preserving income
distribution in Figure 2.1.
I divide the density function and the partial derivative of the CDF function
Fα(I, α) into four intervals as shown in the third graph of Figure 2.1 in the spirit of
Benassi, et, al (2002). The previously specified conditions on the distribution make it
easy to summarize some properties of the effect of the change in the mean preserving
spread parameter (α) on each distribution and allow me to identify the sign of each
3Superscripts represent the numbering of the two distributions.
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Figure 2.1: Double crossing density functions, single crossing CDFs and Fα(I, α)
function
effect on the CDF as in equation (2.2) below. These summarized properties of the
mean preserving income distribution are crucial to my market demand analysis in
later sections.
fα(I, α) ≥ 0 & Fα(I, α) > 0 if I ∈ [Imin, IA]
fα(I, α) < 0 & Fα(I, α) ≥ 0 if I ∈ [IA, IB]
fα(I, α) ≤ 0 & Fα(I, α) < 0 ≥ 0 if I ∈ [IB, IC ]
fα(I, α) > 0 & Fα(I, α) ≤ 0 if I ∈ [IC , Imax]
(2.2)
I assume that consumers make their purchase decisions based on their according
reservation prices. The higher a consumer’s income level the greater the consumer’s
reservation price for a consumption good. Doing so, I am able to identify mar-
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ket demand by mirroring consumers’ income distributions to their corresponding
reservation prices.
The assumption of strict proportionality of consumers reservation prices to their
incomes seems dramatically uncomplicated, however, is suggested by Deaton and
Muellauer (1980) and also applied in the literature (Anderson et al. 1992). Since
my argument rests on the idea of a simple version of mean preserving spread on
income levels, it is convenient to use the income-price assumption to analyze the
relationship between consumers’ income heterogeneity and market demand without
great loss of generality while keeping the essential explaining power relevant to my
research question.
I assume that each consumer purchases at most one unit of a product at a price
less than or equal to his or her corresponding reservation price. The market demand
for the product can then be established as follows:
D(p, α) = 1− F (p, α) (2.3)
Equation (2.3) shows that market demand D(p, α) is a function of the market
price p and the mean preserving parameter α of the income distribution F (p, α).
Clearly, changes in the mean preserving parameter α can determine the status of
market demand at a given price level. And due to my specific assumptions of
the income distribution, changes in the mean preserving parameter α affect mar-
ket demand differently depending on the position of the price level relative to the
corresponding income level in the intervals for a given income distribution.
I assume that the representative consumer’s utility function is of a non-homothetic
form so that the expenditure function and demand function allow for a concave or
convex shape instead of a linear shape. Such specific setting allows the mean pre-
serving parameter α to affect the expenditure function and in turn market demand.
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Doing so I am able to establish an important relationship that is the immediate
connection between income distributions and market demand.
To sum up, in this section I establish the mean preserving income distribution as
the desired income distribution center to my investigation since my goal is to study
how distributive changes in income distribution affect firms’ decision-making on
international expansions: foreign direct investment (FDI) and export. I investigate
how changes in the mean preserve parameter α translate into movements of these
firms’ decision-making. A decrease in the mean preserving parameter α represents
a less concentrated income level around the average income, whereas an increase in
the mean preserving parameter α indicates a more dispersed income distribution for
a given income distribution. How does a situation like this affect market demand
and hence a firms’ profitability in otherwise identical market conditions? The key to
answering this question is to understand the impact of a shift in the mean preserve
parameter α on market demand and profitability of these internationally engaged
firms under different circumstances.
2.2 International expansion
For illustration purposes, I consider a single representative firm who currently sells
only in the home country but considers expand its business overseas. The firm faces
two mutually exclusive options for the international expansion: horizontal foreign
direct investment (FDI) and export. To engage in FDI, the firm needs to invest in
chosen foreign countries to establish associated foreign affiliates in order to produce
and serve these foreign markets. To adopt the export strategy, the firm exports its
domestically manufactured products to foreign markets while incurring trade costs.4
4I only consider the transport cost, which takes the form of the iceberg trade cost.
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To become a multinational entity, the representative firm invests K amount
of capital to build a plant in the host country. The investment is fixed, and once
invested it becomes sunk and unrecoverable. However, the firm needs to pay iceberg
type per unit trade costs (denoted as t > 1) to ship domestic goods to foreign
destinations to become an exporter. In addition to the two different types of fixed
costs, the firm pays a constant unit production cost c regardless of the adoption of
either international business strategy.
I denote the representative firm’s profits under FDI and export strategies as Πf
and Πe, respectively. The firm maximizes its corresponding profits according to the
following two separate profit functions:
Πf = pfDf (pf , α)− cDf (pf , α)−K
Πe = peDe(pe, α)− cDe(pe, α)− tDe(pe, α)
(2.4)
I obtain the two equilibrium prices by solving for the optimized prices as shown
in equation (2.5) and equation (2.6) below:
pf =
1− F (pf , α)− cf(pf , α)
f(pf , α)
(2.5)
pe =
1− F (pe, α)− (c− t)f(pe, α)
f(pe, α)
(2.6)
In order to make proper decisions on which strategy to adopt, the firm compares
the two profits earned in the two alternative scenarios. If profits earned under FDI
strategy is greater than profits earned under export strategy, the firm chooses a FDI
strategy over export, and vice versa. Mathematically, the condition can be written
as ∆Π = Πf − Πe > 0, which yields three different case scenarios for the firm. I
analyze the three different cases in details in the following sections.
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2.2.1 Case I: pf = pe
Firstly, I analyze the case in which the representative firm sets prices under the
two alternative strategies equal to each other in the host country: pf = pe. The
associated profits differential function can be simplified down to the expression
tD(p, α) − K, where tD(p, α) is the trade cost under the export strategy and K
is the fixed cost under the FDI strategy.
The firm chooses the FDI strategy over the export strategy if tD(p, α)−K > 0
or tD(p, α) > K. Likewise, it chooses the export strategy over the FDI strategy if
tD(p, α) −K < 0 or tD(p, α) < K. The firm chooses to adopt an FDI strategy if
trade costs associated with exporting are higher than the amounts required to build
a plant in the host country, and vice versa.
Suppose now that the host country encounters a distributive shock to its con-
sumers’ income,5 the shape of the corresponding income distribution changes as a
result. To show how the distributive shock affects market demand and in turn the
firm’s profitability, I first take a partial derivative with respect to the mean pre-
serving parameter α to the profits differential function ∆Π to obtain the following
result:
∆Πα =
∂∆Π
∂α
= −cFα(p, α) (2.7)
Equation (2.7) shows clearly that the impact depends on the price and the position
of the mean preserving parameter α in the intervals of the income distribution. For
instance, if the firm sets the price in combined region A+B so p ∈ (Imin, IB) market
demand increases in this region as the mean preserving parameter α increases, and
I obtain the associated change in market demand Fα > 0. The following result of
the profit differential function ensues: ∆Πα < 0.
5This can be represented by a decrease or an increase in the mean preserving parameter
α of the income distribution.
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Suppose that currently the firm adopts an FDI strategy so that the profit function
is Πf > Πe. The calculated result calculated means that the difference between
two profits earned under the two alternative strategies becomes larger. The firm
chooses to stay in the foreign market as a multinational enterprise when the income
distribution becomes more concentrated around the mean.6 This shift in income in
region A+B comes from the joining middle income group by the the previously low-
income population. If, on the other hand, the firm was under the export strategy the
firm has an incentive to switch from the export strategy to adopting the alternative
FDI strategy when the gap between two profits Πf and Πe is greater than zero and
continues to grow sufficiently large.
For region C +D as shown in Figure 2.1 the profit differential function ∆Πα >
0 when p ∈ (Ib, Imax) because market demand is negatively related to the mean
preserving parameter α so the associated change in market demand Fα < 0. In
this case, the originally positive gap between two profits under the two alternative
strategies closes as the income shifts towards the mean value from both tails.7 I
assume that the firm has a multinational status, such change in income distribution
entices the firm to quit being a multinational and switch to an export strategy once
the the gap closes completely and turns negative.
When pf = pe and ∆Π > 0 I am able to obtain the following results: as a
country becomes more equal in its consumers’ income levels, i) the representative
firm who initially adopts an FDI strategy remains a multinational enterprise when
the original price is in the lower half of reservation price interval in Figure 2.1; ii)
the firm that adopts an FDI strategy may switch to an export strategy when the
6It means that there are more middle class people in the economy, holding everything
else constant.
7Although the source of the distributive change comes from both ends, the focus is
region C +D or the decrease in income of high-income consumers from the right end.
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predate price is greater than IB as shown in Figure 2.1 and the decrease in the
profits difference between FDI profits and export profits is sufficiently large.
I then move on to show the three cases in which prices under the two strategies
are different from each other, and the three cases are: case i) pf 6= pe: pf with pe in
the same interval; case ii) pf > pe with pf and pe in different intervals; and case iii)
pf < pe with pf and pe in different intervals.
In all three cases I use the same profit difference equation ∆Π, which is derived as
∆Π = (pfD(pf , α)−K)−((pe−c−t)D(pe, α)). Clearly, change in the profit difference
depends on the mean preserving parameter and a change in the mean preserving
parameter α is associated with changes in both market demand and the price. To
reduce the complexity of calculation without losing the essential explaining power,
I assume fixed prices but flexible market demand.8 Taking a partial derivative with
respect to the mean preserving parameter α I acquire the following equation:
∂∆Π
∂α
= pf
∂Df
∂α
− (pe − c− t)∂De
∂α
(2.8)
where ∆Π = Πf −Πe and is the profit differential function. The change in the profit
differences under the two strategies depends on the change in the associated market
demand while holding prices constant.
2.2.2 Case II: pf 6= pe and p in the same interval
i) p ∈ (Imin, IB).
For p ∈ (Imin, IB), I have pf ∂Df∂α < 0 and (pe − c − t)∂De∂α < 0. I investigate
the effect of a more concentrated income due to a decrease in the mean preserving
parameter α on market demand F (p, α). As income becomes more concentrated
around the mean value of the income distribution, market demand in interval p ∈
8This is a short-term assumption as firms do not revise prices frequently in short-term.
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(Imin, IB) falls as prices stay fixed according to my assumption. Again, I assume
that the firm is under a FDI strategy because ∆Π = Πf − Πe > 0.
The partial derivative of the profit differential with respect to the mean preserv-
ing parameter α is ∂∆Π
∂α
< 0 because the increase in revenues under the FDI strategy
associated with a rise in market demand outweighs gains in profits under the export
strategy following the increase in market demand. This result means that a nega-
tive distributive shock (α < 0) to income does not affect the firm’s initial decision
on the international expansion as the positive gap between the two profits widens.
On the other hand, a reverse case happens when the partial derivative of the profit
differential with respect to the mean preserving parameter α is ∂∆Π
∂α
> 0. Under this
circumstance, a more concentrated income around its mean narrows the gap be-
tween two profits under the two alternative strategies. The firm has an incentive to
switch from the FDI strategy to the export strategy once the gap closes completely
and turns negative.
ii) p ∈ (IB, Imax).
If the price p is set in between IB and Imax by the firm, I have pf
∂Df
∂α
> 0 and
(pe − c − t)∂De∂α > 0. Again I assume that the firm adopts the FDI strategy to
begin with. There are two sub-cases to consider in this scenario. The first one is
pf
∂Df
∂α
< (pe− c− t)∂De∂α , and in this case I obtain a result ∂∆Π∂α < 0. Giving the price
and income intervals, the shift in consumers’ income levels towards the middle of
the income distribution within this interval is accompanied by a decrease in market
demand hence a fall in the firm’s revenues under the FDI strategy. If the decrease in
revenues under the FDI strategy is smaller than the decline of the projected profits
under the alternative export strategy, the gap between two profits gets bigger. The
firm has an incentive to continue the FDI strategy as a multinational entity in the
targeted foreign market. The second one is the reverse case in which pf
∂Df
∂α
>
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(pe − c− t)∂De∂α . I obtain a result ∂∆Π∂α > 0. The firm has an incentive to stay in the
host country as a multinational.
2.2.3 Case III: pf 6= pe and p in different intervals
Again, I assume that the representative firm adopts an FDI strategy to begin with.
The sign of the profit differential function ∆Π becomes immediately clear if pf 6= pe
and pf and pe are in different intervals of the income distribution. I consider the
following two sub-cases:
i) pf > pe, pf ∈ (IB, Imax) and pe ∈ (Imin, IB).
For pf ∈ (IB, Imax) and pe ∈ (Imin, IB) I have ∂Dpf ,α∂α > 0 and ∂Dpe,α∂α < 0,
respectively. Therefore, I am able to obtain the following result ∂∆Π
α
= pf
∂Dpf ,α
∂α
−
pe
∂Dpe,α
∂α
> 0 or in short just ∂∆Π
α
> 0.
The rise of the middle income class due to the decrease in the mean preserving
parameter α put a threat on the representative firm’s revenues generating capabil-
ity because of the fall in market demand in the income interval of I ∈ (IB, Imax)
as shown in Figure 2.1. The projected earnings under an export strategy on the
other hand increase in the same situation. The reverse in the revenue generating
mechanism results in a possible switch from an FDI strategy to an export strategy
eventually.
ii) pf < pe, pe ∈ (IB, Imax) and pf ∈ (Imin, IB).
For pe ∈ (IB, Imax) and pf ∈ (Imin, IB) I have ∂Dpe,α∂α > 0 and
∂Dpf ,α
∂α
< 0,
respectively. Therefore, I obtain the following result for the ∆Π function: ∂∆Π
α
=
pf
∂Dpf ,α
∂α
− pe ∂Dpe,α∂α < 0 or in short ∂∆Πα < 0.
By setting the price lower than pe in interval I ∈ (Imin, IB) of the income distribu-
tion, the representative firm is able to continue the FDI strategy as a multinational
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Table 2.1: Summary of all cases
enterprise as a shift to the more concentrated middle income status occurs. The
positive distributive shock in consumers’ income levels boosts market demand for
the firm’s product in this interval whereas it reduces the market share for a price
that is in interval I ∈ (IB, Imax). The overall effect of the distributive shock can
be shown as ∂∆Π
α
< 0 and is negative. The firm has an incentive to remain as a
multinational firm under the FDI strategy in the host country.
Overall, I find that a more equal distribution in income such as a concentration
on middle income contributes to creating a more competitive market for firms hence
affecting the decision-making regarding international expansion by these firms.
I summarize my findings for pf = pe and for all cases pf 6= pe in this section in
Table 2.1 .
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2.3 Empirical Model
2.4 Data description
The empirical part of my study is confined to bilateral trade relationships between
the U.S. and the rest of the world by mainly utilizing the 2002 - 2013 U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) panel FDI and trade data disaggregated by industry and
country. The BEA data covers bilateral U.S. activities in foreign direct investments
(FDI) and international trade, and is the most complete set of data disaggregated
by industry. Data on bilateral trade and FDI between the U.S. and the rest of the
world are disaggregated and classified at the three-digit industry level by the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) standard.
Due to the non-tradability of services and the limitation in data availability
of trade costs (tariffs, transport costs, etc.), service industries including finance,
wholesale, retail and utilities are excluded in my data selection. Moreover, since my
analysis focuses on trade of final goods, primary industry is also not included in my
data selection.
My selected sample contains data for nine countries: Canada, France, Germany,
United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Brazil, Mexico and China. Six of the nine coun-
tries are developed countries, which have relatively low income inequality proxied by
the Gini coefficients. The rest of the three countries are developing countries with
relatively high income inequality or high Gini coefficients relative to more advanced
countries.9 The reason behind the differences in Gini coefficients between the two
groups of countries is not within the scope of this study. However, the idiosyncratic
characteristics that are particular to each country and influence the regressors under
9Six developed countries are Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Australia,
and Japan. And three developing countries are Brazil, Mexico and China.
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the empirical study may bias the estimation results. Therefore, I try to eliminate
such bias by controlling for the effect of those time-invariant characteristics in order
to better assess the net effect of Gini coefficients on the outcome variables.
The fixed effects in my model are assumed to only vary across countries but not
over time. Moreover, since my data span 12 years of period from 2002 to 2013,
special events that affect the outcome variables may happen within a country, I also
control for these unexpected events by removing the time effects.
In the theoretical model, the change of the income distribution stems from a
shift of the mean-preserving parameter α, which is proxied by the Gini coefficient
in the empirical study. The behavior of export, FDI, and the export to FDI ratio or
export-FDI ratio in relation to the Gini coefficients variable is of particular interest
to me. Each predicted value is the conditional mean or the expected value with
respect to the corresponding Gini coefficient. It tells me how the average value of
export, FDI and exp-FDI ratio are related to each value of the Gini coefficient.
Figure 2.2 displays the scatterplots between FDI affiliate sales, exp-FDI ratio
and Gini coefficients. For the scatterplot of the export-FDI ratio and Gini coeffi-
cients, a downward trend between the two variables is observed suggesting a possible
negative correlation between the export-FDI ratio and Gini coefficients. However,
the correlation between FDI affiliate sales and Gini coefficients is not obvious in the
graph.
2.4.1 Model specification
In the FDI and trade literature, factors such as trade costs,10 exchange rates, taxes,
production factors of the host country, proprietary rights and other unobserved fac-
tors may also affect firms’ decision-making on their international expansion. More-
10Transport costs and all types of trade barriers.
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Figure 2.2: Scatterplots: i) export-FDI ratio and Gini coefficients (up), ii) FDI
affiliate sales and Gini coefficients (down)
over, some intrinsic randomness in the exports and FDI sales is bound to occur that
cannot be explained because of human behavior. In addition to the randomness,
the stochastic term may also be an indication of errors of measurement.
I am not able to control for heterogeneity at a firm level due to the data limita-
tion. By definition, heterogeneity is the unobserved variable that does not change
over time. The business practices of a company influence its operations in cer-
tain destinations. Alternatively, I investigate firm heterogeneity across countries
prevalent in different entities. A regular OLS regression method does not take into
account heterogeneity across groups or time.
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I justify the econometric model by referring to developed theories in the trade and
FDI literature. Stochastic factors that may represent other influential independent
variables to dependent variable are explicitly included in the model. Other factors
might affect the dependent variable, yet their combined effects on the dependent
variable may be nonsystematic so they can be incorporated in the error term.
A seemingly natural factor that affects firms’ decisions on international expan-
sions is trade protection. The trade protection hypothesis states that such protec-
tion makes firms likely to substitute FDI production in host countries for exports.
Belderbos (1997) and Blonigen (2002) find evidence of tariff-jumping FDI by using
antidumping measures as the form of trade protection. Although trade protection
has forms of both non-tariff and tariff, in my study I only use tariffs to proxy trade
protection.
Firms with intangible assets such as managerial skills and technologies specific
to them intend to do business in foreign markets are likely to become multinational
enterprises (MNEs) to internalize market transactions on their own. Conventionally,
R&D intensity and advertising intensity are used as proxies for intangible assets. In
my investigation I establish the R&D intensity and use it as the proxy for intangible
assets. The R&D intensity indicator is constructed by using business and industrial
R&D data collected from the National Science Foundation website.
Depreciation and/or appreciation of currencies in use also affect firms’ decision-
making on their international expansions. Swenson (1994) and Kogut and Chang
(1996) find evidence that short-run movements in exchange rates lead to increased
inward FDI. Desai et al (2004a) find that the U.S. foreign affiliates increase their
investment significantly more than local firms during and subsequent to a currency
crisis.
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Effects of taxes on FDI and cross-border trade have been investigated heavily
both theoretically and empirically. According to the hypothesis higher taxes are
supposed to discourage FDI. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) discover a median tax-
elasticity of FDI of −3.3 across 25 studies.
The trade literature also shows that the quality of institutions has non-trivial
impacts on FDI activities. Poor quality of institutions of a host country increases
the cost of doing business in the foreign market and should therefore negatively
affect FDI activities. Due to difficulties in measuring the quality of institutions
across countries, certain indices such as a corruption index is used as the proxy for
the quality of institution. Wei (2000a, b) shows that corruption negatively affects
FDI activities. In this study I obtain the corruption index from the Transparency
Agency website. This corruption index can be interpreted as follows: the higher the
corruption index, the less corrupted a country’s public sector.
I first construct the base model using OLS, taking into account all fixed effects
and estimate the impact of the change in the income distribution by establishing
the following econometric model:
ExFDIi = b0 + b1Ginii + b2ExRatei + b3Tariffi + b4GDPi + b5Assetsi+
+ b6Compeni + b7Corrupi + b8corpTaxi+
+ b9R&Di + b10RelExpi + b11ExpAfi+
+ Trend+ FixedEffects+ ui
(2.9)
where Ginii variable is the Gini coefficient obtained from the World Bank database;
ExRatei is the nominal exchange rates acquired from the Federal Reserve Bank
at St. Louis database; Tariffi is the disaggregated industry level customs tariff
retrieved from the World Trade Organization (WTO) database; GDPi is the real
GDP; Assetsi is the Producers Purchase Index (PPI) deflated real capital stock;
Compeni is the FDI compensation paid to its affiliates and a firm size proxy; Corrupi
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is the corruption index created by the Transparency Agency; corpTaxi is the yearly
corporate tax collected by KPMG; R&Di is the calculated R&D intensity; RelExpi
is the real exports; ExpAfi is the real exports shipped to FDI affiliates and a proxy
for intermediate inputs; Trend is the trend variable accounting for fixed time effects;
FixedEffects accounts for fixed effects of choices; and ui is the disturbance term.
Equation (2.9) is a log-linear function, so all slope coefficients are partial elastic-
ities of the dependent variable with respect to the appropriate explanatory variable.
2.4.2 Results
I report OLS estimates results with and without fixed effects for comparison. I also
re-estimate the base model with a modified least-square fixed effects method and
compare the results with OLS estimates without fixed effects.
My model suggests that FDI itself has trade effects. Exports are associated with
higher variable costs of trade barriers and transport costs, whereas FDI affiliate sales
involve high fixed costs relative to exports. Therefore, firms have an incentive to
substitute one strategy for the other depending on the differentials in such costs. For
example, a natural switch from exports to FDI in a foreign country occurs once the
market is sufficiently large hence has scale economy for MNEs products to overcome
the high fixed sunk costs. Trade effects suggest a negative relationship between
exports and FDI affiliate sales controlling for intermediate exports. Blonigen (2001)
and Head and Ries (2001) find evidence by using Japanese firm-level data that
increase in outbound FDI in the U.S. is negatively related to Japanese exports of
the same finished products.
Table 2.2 presents the estimated results of the base model suggested by equa-
tion (2.9). Although not reported in Table 2.2, I include both fixed industry effects
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Table 2.2: OLS estimates
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and country effects in estimation since it is possible that the errors are correlated
across different industries and countries. The first two columns report OLS esti-
mates of equation (2.9) using export-FDI ratio as the dependent variable including
results with and without industry fixed effects. Columns (iv) - (vii) reports the
OLS estimate of equation (2.9) using FDI affiliate sales and affiliates net income as
dependent variables with and without industry fixed effects, respectively.
The coefficients on Gini coefficients, the exchange rate, real GDP, real total
assets, corruption index, and R&D intensity have the predicted signs and are sta-
tistically significant except for the exchange rate. The coefficients on tariffs and
corporate income tax diverge from the predicted sign.
Though not statistically significant, my finding of the negative sign of the partial
effect of exchange rates on the sales to U.S. foreign affiliates is in accordance with
the suggestions by literature. The partial coefficient for R&D intensity is −4.0567,
indicating that a one percentage increase in the R&D intensity lead to a four per-
centage decrease in the exports-FDI ratio, which is consistent with past findings
that R&D intensity is positively related to FDI sales.
The coefficient on Gini coefficients on export-FDI ratio is negative and statis-
tically significant, indicating that exports are smaller relative to FDI affiliate sales
the greater the Gini coefficients. A relatively high Gini coefficient represents a
more unequal condition in income distribution. This result suggests that a more
concentrated income distribution as shown in the theoretical model is associated
with relatively low export to FDI ratio than a more dispersed income distribution.
The corruption index has negative influence on the export-FDI ratio. As a country
becomes more politically stable as measured by a higher corruption index, foreign
firms have incentives to invest in the country and become MNEs.
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Table 2.3: OLS and LSFE estimates
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Table 2.2 also shows that the destination-market affiliate total capital stock, com-
pensation and industry R&D intensity are important determinants of the presence
of multinational activities than of the FDI share in the export-FDI ratio. Column
(v) includes a full set of independent variables. The coefficients on Gini coefficients,
the exchange rate, real GDP, real total assets, corruption index, the R&D intensity
and corporate income tax have the predicted signs and are statistically significant
except for Gini coefficients. The negative sign of the Gini coefficients indicate the
possibility of negative relationship between FDI affiliate sales and the change in
income distribution.
In Table 2.3, I report both OLS estimates and LSFE (Least Square Fixed Effects)
results for comparison. The difference between Table 2.3 and Table 2.2 is that I
remove the Compensation variable and add Openness to Trade and Openness to
FDI to the estimation. As Table 2.3 results show, the OLS results overestimate the
effect of Gini coefficient on the outcome variable which is the export to FDI affiliate
sales ratio. When fixed effects are taken into account, the effect of the exchange
rate on the outcome variable changes sign from positive to negative. The effect
of GDP becomes insignificant and is used to control for a country size. Per the
LSFE estimates, the Openness to Trade is positive related to the export-FDI ratio
whereas the Openness to FDI is negative related to the outcome variable and both
are consistent with the trade and FDI literature as opposed to OLS results.
2.5 Conclusion
I investigate how distributive changes in income distribution affect firms’ decision-
making on international expansion: foreign direct investment (FDI) and export. I
model the income distribution with a mean preserving income distribution with a
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continuous differentiable unimodal density function. I divide the density function
and the partial derivative of the CDF into four intervals based on the effect of
the mean preserving parameter on the income distribution. Changes in the mean
preserving parameter in these intervals translate into movements of firms’ decision-
making on international expansions. I find that a more equal distribution in income
such as a concentration on middle income contributes to creating a larger market
hence a more competitive market for firms. In addition, some firms benefit from
the increase in the market size. Using Gini coefficient as the proxy for income
distribution, I develop an econometric model with fixed industry effects and coun-
try effects and demonstrate that some firms gain market shares and benefit from
more consumers entering the middle class due to the corresponding change in in-
come distribution. Moreover, the coefficients of the exchange rate, real GDP, real
total assets, corruption index, and R&D intensity have the predicted signs and are
statistically significant.
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CHAPTER 3
INTRODUCTION
Exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) are two main modes of delivering
goods and services to overseas markets. In terms of growth rates, FDI sales have
surpassed international trade since late 80’s of last century and become the major
way of international expansion for domestic firms.
I endogenize FDI and exports as two alternative strategies for international ex-
pansion for firms with heterogeneous productivity levels in a two-country world
setting. I seek to understand responses of firms to changes in market environments
such as time preferences by consumers and the impact of these exogenous changes
on international trade.
I develop a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model within a monopolis-
tic competition setting: consumers have the love for variety, and each firm needs to
pay both entry fixed costs to enter and fixed overhead costs to produce. I assume
homothetic preferences over a continuum of goods for a representative consumer.
Strategic interactions between firms do not arise due to the assumption of a con-
tinuum of goods. Each producer manufactures only one good. The relationship
between a producer and a product is thus one-to-one. This particular setup means
that the relevant profit-maximizing unit can be interpreted as a production line
production.
Three types of firms co-exist in a market: new entrants, existing firms and quit-
ters. Entry of new producers initiates product creation whereas exit of firms brings
about product destruction. Product creation and product destruction match each
other and happen simultaneously in each period due to the unique setting of the
endogenized dynamics of firm productivity levels. Empirical evidences by Bernard,
Redding and Schott (2010) show that product creation and product destruction
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among the U.S. manufacturing firms account for 46.6% and 44% of output, respec-
tively. Therefore, I believe that the simultaneous entry and exit in my model is a
reasonable assumption.
I sort firms by their productivity levels. New entrants with sufficiently high
productivity levels self-select themselves into both the domestic market and inter-
national market. Firms with high enough productivity levels become multinationals;
firms within certain low range of productivity levels only serve domestic markets;
finally firms with in-between productivity levels of the FDI threshold and domestic
producer threshold service foreign markets by exporting. This particular setting is
based on the abundant empirical results that exporters are bigger and more produc-
tive than domestic firms.
Labor is exogenously given for an economy and the only production factor for
firms. Consumers receive income from supplying labor and finance new entrants
through the accumulation of shares in the portfolio of firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 3.1, I provide
the background for model building. In Section 3.2, I develop the intertemporal and
intratemporal models for consumers’ demand, respectively. In section 3.3, I establish
theoretical models for firms’ production. In section 3.4, I describe firms’ entry and
exit in a closed economy. In section 3.5, I introduce firms’ decision on international
expansion. In section 3.6, I model the labor market for the open economy. In section
3.7, I analyze the aggregation and equilibrium conditions for the open economy. In
section 3.8, I derive the national account and terms of trade.
3.1 Model background
The model has a standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) setting and incorporates firm level
productivity differences and product differentiation. Following the model setup by
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Melitz (2003), I move away from a representative firm setting and abstract from
some of the firm-level dynamic stochastic processes while preserving the essential
and intuitive components that explain implications of heterogeneous firms in shaping
certain industries both domestically and internationally.
I assume that firms have increasing return to scale cost structure and compete in
a monopolistic market. Productivity differences between firms reflect not only cost
differences among products but also differences in abilities to respond to exogenous
shocks in the market. I also assume that all firms are forward looking and have
full information about the future market including the entry decision. Firms face
the initial productivity uncertainty before entry and do not know their productivity
levels until entry.
As in Hopenhayn (1992b) and Melitz (2003), I restrict the equilibrium analysis
to steady state equilibria in order to enforce stable aggregate environment overtime.
And a steady state like this induces the simultaneous entry and exit of firms in every
period.
3.2 Model setup
The world has two countries Home and Foreign; and each is populated by homoge-
neous consumers and occupied by a huge mass of prospective firms. Labor is fully
employed in each period. Fully domestic labor mobility ensures wage equalization
across firms within the same industry. Labor is prohibited from migrating to the for-
eign country to seek work opportunities. Therefore wage differentials across the two
countries are allowed. Consumers can trade financial assets in the form of mutual
funds derived from firm ownership. A representative consumer faces both intratem-
poral utility maximization and intertemporal utility maximization problems. Firms
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maximize profits and make decisions based on profit maximization. I then embed
outcomes of these maximization problems into a general equilibrium structure of
the economies.
3.2.1 Demand
i) Intratemporal problem
Each consumer consumes an aggregate good Ct ≡ Ut defined over a continuum
of goods Ω. At any given time t, only a subset of goods is available. The preference
is given by a C.E.S utility function over a continuum of goods indexed by ω for
ω ∈ Ω. A representative consumer has a utility function with ω varieties as follows
Ct =
(∫ ω
0
qt(ω)
ρdω
) 1
ρ
(3.1)
where ω also represents the mass of firms. Goods are substitutes with constant
elasticity of substitution defined as σ = 1
1−ρ between any two goods, and 0 < ρ < 1.
The utility function is subject to a budget constraint
∫ ω
0
pt(ω)qt(ω)d(ω) = It where It
is the representative consumers income level at time t. The representative consumer
solves her intratemporal utility maximization problem, and the optimal consumption
decision over individual varieties is obtained as follows
qt(ω) = Ct
(
pt(ω)
pt
) 1
ρ−1
(3.2)
where pt(ω) denotes the nominal price for good ω and Pt is the aggregate price.
In equilibrium, the total revenue equals the total expenditure in an economy:
PtCt =
∫ ω
0
pt(ω)qt(ω)d(ω). Substituting the individual variety demand function
qt(ω) into the equation, the welfare-based aggregate price index can be obtained as
follows:
Pt =
∫ ω
0
(
pt(ω)
1
1−ρd(ω)
) ρ−1
ρ
(3.3)
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The expenditure or total revenue on a single variety is calculated as rt(ω) =
pt(ω)qt(ω) = PtCt
(pt(ω)
pt
)1−σ
, where the ratio pt(ω)
pt
is the benefit of an extra prod-
uct variety. In real terms, the total revenue function can be written as rrt (ω) =
Ct
(
pt(ω)
pt
)1−σ
. The expenditure on any individual variety is thus proportional to
the total expenditure. The total expenditure or total revenue of an economy is
PtCt =
∫ ω
0
rt(ω)d(ω).
ii) Intertemporal problem
The representative consumer lives an infinite lifetime. In any period t, the con-
sumer maximizes a lifetime expected utility function subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint.
The representative consumer’s expected lifetime utility function is defined as
E
∞∑
s−t
βsU(Cs) (3.4)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective time preference discount factor. Because I assume
that consumers are able to trade financial assets. In order to control for consumers’
different tastes in financial risks, I assume a CRRA form period utility function
U(Cs) =
1
1−θC
1−θ
s , in which θ > 0, θ 6= 1 and θ = −C U
′′
(C)
U ′ is the constant coefficient
of relative risk aversion.
Consumers own xt shares entering period t in a mutual fund of firm.
1 The mutual
fund pays a total profit in units of currency in each period equals to partial profits
of all firms that earned in that period. In period t, the representative consumer
purchases xt+1 new shares before going into period t + 1 as an investment. The
total number of firms forming the mutual fund is Mt (including new entrants) with
average price z˜t and average profit pit. Firms pay dividends at time t+1. Consumers
can also trade domestic bonds (B) and foreign bonds B∗ that yield interest rates
1Mutual fund shares xt is introduced in in the sense of Ghironi and Melitz (2007) and
Contessi (2007, 2015).
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rt and r
∗
t , respectively. Consumers enter period t with xt shares and receive income
in forms of wage WtLt, dividends on share holdings pitxt, the sale value of initial
share position z˜txt and the interest payments from owning bonds. Consumers then
allocate income resources between purchases of goods and purchases of new mutual
fund shares. The intertemporal budget constraint can be written as
Ct + ˜zt+1Mtxt+1 +Bt+1 +B
∗
t+1 = WtLt + z˜tMtxt + pitMtxt+
+ (1 + rt)Bt +
εtP
∗
t
Pt
(1 + r∗t )Bt
(3.5)
where εt is the nominal exchange rate, and
εtP ∗t
Pt
= et is the real exchange rate.
To reduce the complexity in calculation while preserving essential parts for anal-
ysis, I assume that consumers do not trade bonds due to financial regulations in
a closed economy. As a result, a representative consumer faces the intertemporal
optimization problem as follows:
max
{Ct,xt}
Et
( ∞∑
t=0
βtUt
)
s.t. Ct + z˜t+1Mtxt+1 = WtLt + pitMtxt + z˜tMtxt
(3.6)
Consumers purchase xt+1shares of a mutual fund for a total of Mtxt+1 shares in each
period t. There is ME,t mass of new entrants financed by new investments in each
period t and is implicitly embedded in z˜t+1Mtxt+1. Rearrange the budget constraint,
I am able to obtain the national account of the autarky economy: 0 = (WtLt +
z˜tMtxt+pitMtxt)−(Ct+z˜t+1Mtxt+1). The zero net international investment position
on the left hand side is equal to aggregate income minus the total expenditure
of an economy on the right hand side. The solution to the intertemporal utility
maximization problem yields an Euler equation for share holdings of the economy:
β(1− γ)Et
( Ct
Ct+1
)θ
( ˜zt+1 + ¯pit+1) = z˜t + pit = v¯t (3.7)
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The value v¯t is the expected post-entry profit. The intertemporal consumption ratio
Ct
Ct+1
adds stochastic characteristics to the exogenously discount factor β(1 − γ),
yielding a stochastic discount expression β(1− γ)( Ct
Ct+1
)θ
.
3.3 Production
There is a continuum of firms of which each produces a single variety ω for ω ∈ Ω.
Production obeys the increasing returns to scale rule. Firms maximize profits and
compete in a monopolistically competitive market. Entering the market requires
sunk costs amounting to fe. These sunk costs are unavoidable and can be treated as
development and distribution costs. Labor is the only production factor and fixed by
the total labor endowment L¯. I assume full employment Lt = L¯. Costs of all kinds
are measured in labor units. It requires lt(φ) = ft +
qω
φ
labor units to produce qt(ω)
units of output of variety ω in period t. The variable ft is the fixed overhead cost
in labor units and applies to every producing firm. Parameter φ is the idiosyncratic
productivity level of a firm and time invariant. The unit cost of production is the
real wage Wt/Pt ≡ wt and represents wt units of consumption basket Ct. The total
cost function can be written as
TCt(ω) = WtLt(ω) = Wt(ft +
qt(ω)
φ
) (3.8)
The real total cost function can be calculated as tct(ω) = wtft +
wtqt(ω)
φ
units of
the consumption basket Ct. Component wtftis the real fixed cost and
wtqt
φ
is the
real variable cost. The average cost function is computed as act(ω) =
wtft
qt(ω)
+ wt
φ
and the marginal cost function is mct(ω) =
wt
φ
. The average cost function clearly
implies an increasing return to scale property whereas the marginal cost function
shows different marginal cost of production between products due to different φ.
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Each firm maximizes its profits by maximizing the following equation: pit(ω) =
pt(ω)qt(ω)− TCt(ω). The optimal price for each firm or variety is calculated as
pω,t(φ) =
Wt
φρ
=
Wt
φ
σ
σ − 1 (3.9)
where σ
σ−1 =
1
ρ
is the markup over the marginal cost for each firm. The markup is
independent of the number of varieties or firms. The optimal price in real terms can
be written as %ω,t(φ) =
Wt
φ
σ
σ−1 =
Wt
Ptφρ
= wtσ
φ(σ−1) units of consumption basket.
Each firms revenue and profit can be calculated as follows
rω,t(φ) =pω,t(φ)qω,t(φ) = PtCt
(
Pt
φ
Wt
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
piω,t(φ) =
rω,t(φ)
σ
−Wtft
[t] (3.10)
In real terms the total revenue for variety ω is rω,t(φ) = Ct
(
Pt
φ
Wt
σ−1
σ
)σ−1
units of
consumption basket Ct and the total profits for variety ω is pi
∗
ω,t(φ) =
trω,t(φ)
σ
− wtft
of consumption basket Ct. Profits are returned to consumers as dividends and lent
to new entrants as loans.
3.4 Firm Entry and Exit in Autarky
A large and unbounded pool of potential entrants decides whether to enter pro-
duction, and all perspective entrants are identical prior to entry. These entrants
correctly anticipate their expected future profits vt(φ) as a function of the produc-
tivity level φ. Upon entry, each new entrant draws a relative level of productivity
φ from a common distribution of productivity denoted as h(φ). The common dis-
tribution is time-invariant and identical across the two countries. If φ is sufficiently
low, a firm will exit immediately and never produce after invests fe,t labor units
of sunk costs. If φ is high enough, the firm will produce but face γ probability
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of exit-inducing shock in every period t.2 A producing manufacturer produces at
the same productivity level over time until it is hit by a bad shock γ and forced
to exit. Therefore the ex-ante survival probabilities are determined exogenously by
both h(φ) and γ.
A successful entrant becomes a realized producer immediately in the same period.
Prospective entrants in time t calculate their value function that is the present
discounted value of the expected stream of future profits:
vt(φ) = max{0, Et
∞∑
s=t+1
[β(1− γ)]s
( Ct
Cs+t
)θ
pit(φ)}
= max{0, β(1− γ)Et
( Ct
Cs+t
)θ
pit(φ)}
(3.11)
The expression β(1 − γ)Et
(
Ct
Cs+t
)θ
is a discount factor that reflects the optimal in-
vestment behavior of consumers who also take in to account firms exit (1− γ).
The cutoff productivity level for successful new entrants is defined as φc =
inf{φ : v(φ) > 0 and pi(φc) = 0}. A new entrant is successful when φ > φc, and it
produces immediately in the same period. So the ex-ante probability of successful
entry can be written as Pre = 1 − H(φc), where H(φ) is the cumulative density
function of the common productivity distribution h(φ).
I denote Me,t as the mass of new entrants in each period t. As a result, the num-
ber of unsuccessful new entrants and successful new entrants can be calculated as
H(φc)Me,t and Pre,tMe,t = 1−H(φc)Me,t, respectively. A firm may exit the domes-
tic market for two reasons: as an unsuccessful entrant or as a bad luck producer.3
The mass of incumbent firms equals Mt−PreMe,t, in which Mt is the total number
2Lee and Mukoyama (2007) find that the exit rates throughout booms and recessions
are very similar at 5.8 and 5.1 percent, resepectively. So the average exit rates are relative
steady regardless of economic environment.
3Producers hit by the bad shock consequently exit including both successful new en-
trants and existing producers.
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of producers in equilibrium. The number of effective new entrants is then calculated
as (1 − γ)PreMe,t. If (1 − γ)PreMe,t = γ(Mt − PreMe,t) or PreMe,t = γMt, that
is, the remaining new entrants completely replace the exit incumbent firms in each
period, the exit process would not affect the equilibrium productivity distribution.
Thus, in each period, the number of survival producers is established as follows:
(1− γ)PreMe,t + (1− γ)(Mt − PreMe,t) = (1− γ)Mt (3.12)
Conditioning on successful entries, the expected value of productivity levels φ ∈
[φc,∞] is established as
φ¯t(φ
c) =
(∫ ∞
φc
φσ−1
h(φ)
1−H(φc)dφ
) 1
σ−1
(3.13)
Since firms are forward looking and have full information about the market, the
expected stream of future profits becomes the realized average profits:
v¯t(φ) = β(1− γ)
( Ct
Ct+1
)θ
p¯it(φ¯(φ
c)) (3.14)
Net free entry condition is such that potential entrants evaluate the net value of
entry (ve,t) against the fixed sunk entry cost (fe,t) in each period. No firm would
want to enter if the net value of a successful entry is less than the fixed entry sunk
cost. So long as the mass of new entrants is positive, the following Free Entry
Condition holds
(1−H(φc))β(1− γ)
( Ct
Ct+1
)θ
p¯it(φ¯(φ
c)) = Wtfe,t = v¯t(φ)
→ p¯it(φ¯(φc)) = Wtfe,t
(1−H(φc))β(1− γ)
( Ct
Ct+1
)−θ (3.15)
The Free Entry Condition in real terms is thus p¯irt (φ¯(φ
c)) = Wtfe,t
(1−H(φc))β(1−γ)
(
Ct
Ct+1
)−θ
.
The real average profit function can be written as barpirt (φ¯(φ)) =
t¯rω,t(φ)
σ
− wtft, in
which t¯rω,t(φ)
σ
=
(
φ¯
φc
)σ−1
trt(φ
c) and trt(φ
c) = σwtft. Therefore, the second relation-
ship between the real average profit and the cutoff productivity can be calculated
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as follows:
p¯it(φ¯(φ
c)) =
t¯rω,t(φ)− trt(φc)
trt(φc)
wtft. (3.16)
3.4.1 Equilibrium in autarky
The threshold productivity level φc, aggregated price Pt and aggregated total rev-
enues TRt determine a stationary equilibrium, which must satisfy both the Free
Entry Condition and the Zero Cutoff Profit Condition calculated previously. In
equilibrium, all aggregate variables stay constant without the influence of outside
shocks. The number of firms is determined by aggregated variables in equilibrium.
Since the distribution of productivity levels h(φ) remains constant throughout
all periods, an industry comprised of M firms (in equilibrium) with any distribution
of productivity levels h(φ) that yields the same average productivity level φ¯ induces
the same aggregate outcome as M firms share the same productivity level φ = φ¯.
Aggregated variables obtained in equilibria depend on the number of firms. I denote
average revenues and average profits as r¯ = TR
M
and p¯i = Π
M
, respectively.
The detailed description of equilibrium and labor market is discussed in later
sections where international expansion is introduced.
3.5 International Expansion
All domestic firms in autarky economies (Home and Foreign) have the opportunity
to engage in the international market through two viable strategies: exporting to
the overseas market (export strategy) or building a plant and selling products in the
host country (FDI strategy). Both strategies happen after firms gain knowledge of
their productivity levels. In addition to selling in a foreign country, both exporters
and multinational firms (MNEs) continue to sell domestically.
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I consider an open economy with trade costs. In each period, exporters need to
pay fixed exporting costs wtfx,t units of domestic consumption as well as the iceberg
unit transport costs τt > 1; whereas multinational enterprises entail fixed costs of
fm,t = w
∗
t f
∗
m,t units of foreign consumption to build a plant in the host country.
Export sales in the destination are converted back to domestic currency by nom-
inal exchange rate εt. Multinational firms hire foreign labor to produce therefore
pay foreign workers W ∗t amount nominal wages in local currency. So the Home
exporters and Home MNEs optimal prices in real terms are calculated as follows
%x,t,ω(φ) =
τtwt
φ
σ
σ − 1 , %m,t,ω(φ) =
w∗t
φ
σ
σ − 1 (3.17)
In addition to imports from Home country, Foreign consumers also have access
to domestically produced varieties charged at %∗ω,t =
w∗t
φ
σ
σ−1 . The Foreign local
producers optimal prices are different from the Home multinationals optimal prices
in Foreign in a sense of productivity differentials. In each period, Home exporters
earn nominal profits piω,t(φ)+max{piω,t(φ)}. And Home multinationals earn nominal
profits piω,t(φ) +max{0, pim,t,ω(φ)}.
When countries open up and engage in international sales, three ex-ante sur-
vival probability conditions co-exist in every period for successful entrants based on
three different cutoff productivity levels. The ex-ante probability that one of these
successful entrants will become a multinational is Prm =
1−H(φcm)
1−H(φc) . The ex-ante
probability that one of these successful entrants will export is Prx =
H(φcm)−H(φcx)
1−H(φc) .
The domestic only producers have an ex-ante probability of PrD =
H(φcx)−H(φc)
1−H(φc) .
Therefore, the total mass of firms or varieties available in Home is MT,t = PrDMt +
Pr∗xM
∗
t + Pr
∗
mM
∗
t . And the total mass of firms or varieties available in Foreign is
M∗T,t = Pr
∗
DM
∗
t + Pr
∗
xMt + Pr
∗
mMt.
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Recall firms’ value function is vt(φ) = max{0, β(1−γ)Et
(
Ct
Ct+1
)θ
pit(φ)}.Potential
exporters and prospective multinationals evaluate their updated value function to
decide whether to enter the international market. For exporters, the cutoff pro-
ductivity φcx is such that φ
c
x = inf{φ : φ ≥ φcx and pix(φ) > 0}. By a similar
reasoning, the cutoff productivity φcm for multinationals is defined as φ
c
m = inf{φ :
φ ≥ φcm and pim(φ) > 0}.
If φcm = φ
c
x = φ
c, all producers become multinationals. If φcm = φ
c
x > φ
c,
some firms whose productivities fall in the range of φc < φ < φcm = φ
c
x produce
and sell only in the domestic market. If φcm > φ
c
x > φ
c, firms with productivity
φcx < φ < φ
c
m become exporters who produce in Home and sell in both the domestic
market and Foreign market. Only firms in the highest possible productivity range of
φcm < φ adopt the FDI strategy and become multinational firms who invest in host
country and produce and sell in both countries. Therefore, the three Zero Cutoff
Conditions for domestic producers, exporters and multinational firms are computed
as p¯iD,t(φ
c) = 0, p¯ix,t(φ
c
x) = 0, and p¯im,t(φ
c
m) = 0, respectively.
In the presence of international businesses, the average productivity levels can
be defined separately for the three groups of firms. I denote domestic only producers
productivity level as φD, exporters productivity level as φx, and multinational firms
productivity level as φm. The corresponding equations are established as follows
φ¯D(φ
c) =
(∫ φcx
φc
φσ−1
h(φ)
H(φcx)−H(φc)
dφ
) 1
σ−1
=
(∫ φcm
φcx
φσ−1
h(φ)
H(φcm)−H(φcx)
dφ
) 1
σ−1
φ¯m(φ
c) =
(∫ ∞
φcm
φσ−1
h(φ)
1−H(φcm)
dφ
) 1
σ−1
(3.18)
Regardless of their engagement in the international market, exporters and multi-
nationals always produce and sell in the domestic market. All firms face the common
productivity distribution h(φ) before entry and the same bad shock probability δ af-
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ter entry. All exporters face the same fixed entry export costs and iceberg unit cost,
and all multinational enterprises have the same fixed entry costs in the host country.
Therefore, the profit functions for domestic producers, exporters and multinational
firms can be written as
pid,t(φ) =
rD,t(φ)
σ
−Wtft
piEX,t(φ) =
rD,t(φ) + rx,t(φ)
σ
−Wtfx,t
piM,t(φ) =
r∗D,t(φ) + r
∗
m,t(φ)
σ
−W ∗t f ∗x,t
(3.19)
The real average profits earned by total domestic sales, total exports sales and FDI
sales can be established as p¯irD,ω,t(φ
c) =
t¯rD,ω,t(φ
c)
σ
− w∗t f ∗t , respectively.
The average profits for all Home firms conditioned on successful entry at time t
can then be written as p¯it(φ) =
1
1−H(φc) p¯iD,t(φ)+
H(φcm)−H(φcx)
1−H(φc) p¯ix,t(φ)+
1−H(φcm)
1−H(φc) p¯im,t(φ).
The zero profit cutoff conditions yield the real average profit function as a function
of cutoff productivity levels:
p¯irt (φ) = wtft
[( φ¯(φc)
φc
)σ−1
− 1
]
+ wtfx,t
[( φ¯(φcx)
φcx
)σ−1
− 1
]
+
+ w∗t f
∗
t
[( φ¯(φcm)
φcm
)σ−1
− 1
] (3.20)
The free entry condition for an open economy is still the same in that potential
firms do not know their productivity levels until they decide to enter and pay the
fixed entry costs. So the relationship between the average profit and cutoff entry
productivity level in the free entry condition is the same as before and given as
p¯i(φ¯(φc)) = Wtfe,t
1−H(φc)β(1−γ)
(
Ct
Ct+1
)−θ
.
3.6 Labor Market in the open economy
Labor market conditions do not change when the autarky economy makes a transi-
tion to an open economy by engaging in international market via trade or FDI. In
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an open economy, the aggregate income needs not necessarily equal the payments
to all labor supply of the economy.
I assume that regardless of their success status in each period, new entrants to
the domestic market raise the capital amounts to wtft which provides a random
return of pit(φ) for φ > φ
c or zero for φ ≤ φc. Entrants to the international market
always make positive profits thus do not face such uncertainty. These entrants have
realized productivity levels that are greater than the cutoff productivity φc and
therefore self-select themselves into the international market.
I assume that labor supply is inelastic and the labor size is fixed and exogenously
determined for a country. The fixed labor endowment L¯ consists of two types: the
fixed entry labor investment Le,t = ME,tfe,t and the production labor Lp,t = lt(ω).
Labor market equilibrium requires that the two components of labor demand sum
to aggregate labor supply: L¯ = Le,t +Lp,t. The profit maximization equation yields
a relationship between the real total revenue and real total payments to labor:
wtL¯ = tr
r
t − Πrt + Le,t. (3.21)
In each period, γMT mass of firms including both the successful entrants and
the incumbents exit the market. In equilibrium, the mass of successful new entrants
(1−H(φc))ME,t must be matched by the number of firms hit by the bad shock γMT .
I can then establish the relationship between the mass of successful new entrants
ME,t and total number of firms: (1 − H(φc))ME,t = γMT , which yields ME,t =
γMT
(1−H(φc)) . Market clearing condition requires that the fixed new entry investment to
be the exact amount paid to the fixed entry investment labor: wtLe,t = wtME,tfe,t.
Recall the free entry condition in which the relationship between average profits p¯it
and cutoff productivity level φc is established as p¯it(φ¯(φ
c)) = Wtfe,t
1−H(φc)β(1−γ)
(
Ct
Ct+1
)−θ
.
Using these equations, a relationship between the aggregate profit and the fixed
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entry labor cost can be derived as
γΠt =
wtLe,t
β(1− γ)
( Ct
Ct+1
)θ
(3.22)
The expression β(1− γ)( Ct
Ct+1
)
is a discount factor that reflects the optimal invest-
ment behavior of consumers in equilibrium. This relationship shows that in each
period the lost profits due to bad shock equal the payments to labor of new firms
taking into account the discount factor to keep the economy in equilibrium. This
means that the amount needed to finance new firms in each period sums to the lost
profits γΠt. The remaining profits (1−γ)Πt goes back to labor in form of dividends.
This equation clearly shows that profits earned in each period are affected by op-
timal intertemporal consumption, the investment decisions and the time preference
parameter β.
3.7 Aggregation and equilibrium in the open economy
The aggregate price, aggregate revenues, aggregate profits and market demand for
the open economy depend on the number of firms in equilibrium and their respective
expressions can be established as follows:
Pt =
(∫ ∞
0
pt(φt)
1−σh(φ)dφ
) 1
1−σ
= M
1
1−σ
T pt(φ¯t)
TRt = MT
∫ ∞
0
rt(φ)h(φ)dφ = MT rt(φ¯t)
Πt = MT
∫ ∞
0
pit(φ)h(φ)dφ = MTpit(φ¯t)
Ct =
(
MT
∫ ∞
0
qt(φt)
σ−1
σ h(φ)dφ
) σ
σ−1
= M
σ
σ−1
T qt(φ¯t)
(3.23)
The combined aggregate productivity in equilibrium is calculated as
φ¯t =
1
MT
(
φ¯σ−1t M +
H(φcm)−H(φcx)
1−H(φc)
)
(φcx,t)
σ−1M+
+
1−H(φcm)
1−H(φc) (φ
c
m,t)
σ−1M
(3.24)
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where φcx,t = τt
(
fx,t
ft
) 1
σ−1
φc and φcm,t =
(
W ∗t
W ∗t
) σ
1−σ
(
f∗t
ft
)
φc. An increase in the number
of firms implies that consumers derive more welfare from spending a given nominal
amount.
Equilibrium mass of firms is determined by these aggregate conditions. In equi-
librium, MT mass of firms shares the same weighted average of the productivity level
φ¯ as the average price, average revenues, average profits and aggregate demand and
all depend on the average productivity. The combined total mass of varieties or
firms in equilibrium is thus
MT =
(
1 +
H(φcm)−H(φcx)
1−H(φc +
1−H(φcm)
1−H(φc)
)
Mt (3.25)
Mt is the total number of firms that operate in the domestic market in equilibrium.
And Mt can be calculated using the aggregate revenue condition Mt =
TRt
r¯t
as follows
Mt =
WtL¯+ 1−
(
1−γ
rt
)
ME,tfe,t
σ
(
p¯it +Wtft +
H(φcm)−H(φcx)
1−H(φc) Wtfx,t +
1−H(φcm)
1−H(φc) W
∗
t f
∗
t εt
) (3.26)
Comparing with the number of firms operating in equilibrium of an autarky economy,
the equilibrium number of varieties in an open economy shrinks due to the exit of
domestic firms with lowest levels of productivity.
The engagement in the international markets by firms with high productivity
levels induces an increase in the cutoff productivity level from the autarky level φcA
to an open economy level φcI , as a result the average profits per firm increase. Recall
the shared free entry condition for both market regimes p¯it(φ¯(φ
c)) = γrtWtfe,t
(1−H(φc))(1−γ) .
As the cutoff productivity level φc for entering goes up, the ex-ante probability of
successful entry 1−H(φc) decreases. Firms who draw productivity level φc between
φcA < φ
c < φcI exit foreign market immediately upon entry without producing. And
former incumbents whose productivity level φc falls in between φcA and φ
c
I also leave
the foreign market due to negative profits earned. This is also the reason behind the
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shrinking of the number of equilibrium domestic only producers. Firms with high
enough productivity levels enter the international market as exporters (φc > φcx)
or multinationals (φc > φcm). The entry and exit of firms and the reallocation of
market shares toward more efficient firms combined increase aggregate productivity
gain in an open economy. Therefore, the average profits in an open economy are
higher than the average profits in a closed economy. Furthermore, the decrease in
the number of domestic firms is more than offset by the number of firms entering into
the exporting market and foreign market via FDI. Overall the equilibrium number
of total firms MT in the open market is bigger than the equilibrium number of firms
(Mt) in autarky as
MT =
(
1 +
H(φcm)−H(φcm)
1−H(φc) +
1−H(φcm)
1−H(φc)
)
Mt > Mt. (3.27)
Benefits are not equally distributed among firms that engage in international
businesses for these firms have higher fixed costs than firms that compete only
domestically. Allowing the engagement in international market via trade and FDI
is costly to an economy. The most efficient firms with sufficiently high productivity
levels (φcm < φ
c) gain the most by breaking into a new market as multinationals in
the foreign country as well as continuing to sell in domestic market hence gaining
market shares. By the same reasoning, exporters (φcx < φ
c < φcm) obtain more
market shares by accessing the foreign market. There exists a cutoff productivity
level φ∆ > φcm that partitions gainers and losers in the international market. Firms
with φc ≥ φ∆ see their profits increase whereas firms with φc = φcm lose profits while
gaining market share. Firms with low efficiency or sufficiently low productivity
between φcA < φ
c < φcm exit the market due to negative profits. Market shares
of exit firms drop to zero. Therefore, multinational firms gain the most in market
shares.
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To further elaborate, I compare firms’ revenues in three different markets: do-
mestic, export and foreign for FDI. Two types of firms sell in domestic market:
the domestic only producers and firms with international businesses. The average
domestic sales rd,t(φ) in an open economy are smaller than the average domestic
revenues rA,t(φ) obtained in an autarky due to the exit of low efficient firms and
reallocation of sales to foreign markets of exporters and multinationals. Individual
firm that only operates domestically thus incur a total revenue loss. But the overall
average sales rd,t(φ) + rx,t(φ) + rm,r(φ) of all firms of a country in the open economy
are larger than the autarky revenues rA,t(φ).
3.8 National account and Terms of Trade
Rearranging the budget constraint equation, I can obtain the national account for
the autarky economy: 0 = (wtLt+z˜tMtxt+p¯i
r
tMt)−(Ct+z˜tMtxt+1). The net interna-
tional investment position is equal to aggregate income minus the total expenditure
of an economy and is zero in a closed economy. In equilibrium, I impose the condition
xt = xt+1 and normalize each value of the two variables to one. The GDP identity
for the closed economy can thus be established as GDP ≡ Ct+ z˜tMt = wtLt+ v¯tMt.
Total consumption Ct plus new investment z˜tMt must equal the total income.
New investments include the finance of new firms or varieties and the new purchased
shares by consumers. Both types of investments are implicitly embedded in the
national account identity. The new purchase of new shares is essentially a transfer
of income from the purchaser to the receiver. Therefore, the total expenditure is
Ct + z˜tME,t after taking into account the net transfer of incomes. The revised
GDP identity of the closed economy is therefore GDP ≡ Ct + z˜tME,t = wtLt +
v¯tMt. This updated GDP equation tells me that the allocation of resources between
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consumption and investment of the economy is reflected in the allocation of labor
between the production sector and the new entrant sector.
According to the definition by the IMF, Current Account consists of three com-
ponents: net exports, primary income and secondary income.4 My model suggests
null secondary income. As a result, the Current Account of the open economy is the
sum of the net exports and the net repatriation of FDI profits (primary income).
The net export is equal to exports or foreign consumption of domestic goods mi-
nus imports or domestic consumption of foreign goods, and it can be calculated
as: etC
∗
tMx,t(%¯x,t)
1−σ − M∗x,t(%¯∗x,t)1−σCt, where et = P
∗
t
Pt
is the real exchange rate.
The primary income or the net recipients of domestic MNEs can be computed as:
Mm,t ¯pim,t − etM∗m,tp¯i∗m,t. Combining the two components, the Current Account can
then be established as follows
CAt = (etC
∗
tMx,t(%¯x,t)
1−σ)−M∗x,t(%¯∗x,t)1−σCt + (Mm,tp¯im,t − etM∗m,tp¯i∗m,t). (3.28)
The terms of trade (tott) are endogenously determined in my model and are
defined as the price of imports per unit of exports of the economy: tott =
et%¯x,t
%¯∗x,t
. The
average prices in the equation can be treated as trade-weighted indices of average
prices. An increase in the terms of trade tott represents improved international trade
terms for the home country so per unit of exports sold can purchase more imports.
3.9 Conclusion
I develop a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model and endogenize FDI and
export as two alternative strategies for firms’ international expansion options in
a two-country world. The model has a standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) and Melitz
(2003) model setup and incorporates firm level productivity differences and product
4Please refer to the Balance of Payment manual of the IMF for detailed information.
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differentiation. I separate firms into four categories based on their productivity
levels. I show that the average domestic sales in an open economy are smaller than
the average domestic revenues obtained in an autarky due to the exit of lowest
productivity firms and reallocation of sales to foreign markets of exporters and
multinationals. But the overall average sales of all firms in the open economy are
larger than those in the closed economy. In addition, the equilibrium number of
total firms in the open market is bigger than the equilibrium number of firms in
the autarky. I also show that benefits incurred by international engagement are not
equally distributed among firms. The highest productivity firms gain the most by
breaking into a new market as multinationals. The second highest productivity firms
become exporters and obtain the second largest market share. The third highest
productivity firms only serve the domestic market. And the lowest productivity
firms exit the market.
.
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